MI6 Urged UK to Drop Saudi Inquiry

 

By DAVID STRINGER

The Associated Press
Tuesday, January 29, 2008; 6:34 PM

 

LONDON -- Britain's head of overseas intelligence warned that Saudi Arabia likely would stop sharing vital information on terrorism if prosecutors pursued an investigation into alleged corruption in an arms deal, lawmakers disclosed Tuesday.

Ministers were told the inquiry into the BAE Systems PLC arms deal with Saudi Arabia could lead to a withdrawal of Saudi assistance on counterterrorism, according to the annual report of the Intelligence and Security committee. The committee scrutinizes the work of Britain's intelligence and security agencies.

Britain's Serious Fraud Office in December 2006 ended the inquiry into allegations that BAE Systems ran a $118.9 million "slush fund" offering sweeteners to Saudi Arabian officials in return for lucrative arms contracts.

BAE has denied the accusations. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, a former ambassador to the United States and now head of Saudi Arabia's National Security Council, has also denied that he profited from the deal.

MI6, Britain's overseas intelligence service, believed Saudi Arabia likely would end information-sharing with Britain if investigators continued the inquiry, former Attorney General Peter Goldsmith told the committee. MI6 raised objections to the prosecution before Britain's Serious Fraud Office decided to end the case, he said.

"All relevant agencies were clear about the crucial importance of U.K.-Saudi co-operation in the fight against terrorism and the damage to U.K. interests _ and, potentially, U.K. lives _ if that co-operation were withdrawn," Goldsmith said.

Then-Prime Minister Tony Blair explained the decision to drop the case by insisting Saudi Arabia had privately threatened to end intelligence ties if it continued. Saudi officials did not make the threat publicly _ arrousing some public skepticism over the scrapping of the inquiry.

The head of MI6, John Scarlett, told the committee that antagonizing Saudi Arabia risked losing vital intelligence.

"There were threats made to the existence of the co-operation (and) there was reason to take those threats seriously," he said. "Saudi Arabia is an absolutely key country ... they have turned themselves into a very important and powerful player in the world counterterrorism campaign."

After the inquiry was dropped, Saudi Arabia signed a $8.7 billion agreement with Britain to buy 72 Eurofighter Typhoon jets from BAE.

Le rapport de la communauté américaine du renseignement sur les capacités nucléaires iraniennes, novembre 2007

Paru il y a 48 heures, ce NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) défraie déja la chronique. Préparé, comme le veut la tradition pour les NIE, de concert entre les 16 services de renseignements américains (Citons par exemple le Homeland Security, la Central Intelligence Agency, la National Security Agency, le Defense Intelligence Agency, ainsi que le service de renseignement du Ministère de l'Energie US ou le service de renseignements du Département d'Etat) et intitulé "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities" en date de novembre 2007, ce rapport indique entre autres que si l'Iran avait bien un programme nucléaire , il a été arrêté en 2003. A vos commentaires!

 

 

Key Judgments

A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear work.
• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
previously.

B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge
with high confidence it has not yet done.

C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
it to restart the program.
• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible.

 F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—
rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
restarted through at least mid-2007.

G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

 

1 For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design
and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we
do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.

 

 Key Differences Between the Key Judgments of This Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear
Program and the May 2005 Assessment

2005 IC Estimate

 Assess with high confidence that Iran
currently is determined to develop nuclear
weapons despite its international
obligations and international pressure, but
we do not assess that Iran is immovable.

 

We have moderate confidence in projecting
when Iran is likely to make a nuclear
weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before
early-to-mid next decade.

 

Iran could produce enough fissile material
for a weapon by the end of this decade if it
were to make more rapid and successful
progress than we have seen to date.

 

 

2007 National Intelligence Estimate

 

Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge
with high confidence that the halt lasted at least
several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate
confidence that the halt to those activities
represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons
program.) Assess with moderate confidence
Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know
whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt
was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from
exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear
work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence
that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
option to develop nuclear weapons.

We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate
confidence Iran probably would be technically
capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR
judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this
capability before 2013 because of foreseeable
technical and programmatic problems.)

 

We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen ,Рольф Моватт-Ларсен

 

 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen's career. 

 

Фото здесь Photo is here 

La biographie de Rolf Mowatt-Larssen est aussi disponible en francais ici 

 

Карьера сотрудника ЦРУ Рольф Моватт-Ларсен

 

Начал карьеру в ЦРУ, Оперативный Директорат в 1982ом году.

Сотрудник резидентуры ЦРУ в Стокольме с 1984 по 1987.

Сотрудник резидентуры ЦРУ в Москве с 1988 по 1990,Моватт-Ларсен официально работал в политическом отделе Посольства США в Москве.

С 1990 по 1992 работал в резидентуре ЦРУ в Афинах но не удалось кстановить кем он был Руководитель резидентуры, заместитель или сотрудник.

С 1992 по 1994 Заместитель резидента ЦРУ в Москве, Моватт-Ларсен отвечал за контакты с СВР (Служба внешней разведки ). Но когда руководителя резидентуры Джеймс Моррис был объявлен персоной нон грата после выдворений резидента СВР в Вашингтоне А.И. Лысенко, Моватт-Ларсен становиться резидентом ЦРУ . Hо не на долго. Он уже 2 года в Москве и слишком молод чтобы быть постоянным резидентом. Прибывает новый резидент, опытный сотрудник Майкл Сулик, официально советник по региональным вопросам посольства.

 В 1994 Моватт-Ларсена назначают руководителем Оперативной Базы ЦРУ в Цюрихе он занимает этот пост до 1996.

 Руководитель резидентуры ЦРУ в Осло с 1998 по 2000.

 Он работал с Д.Тенетом (Директор ЦРУ) а с середины 2001 начал учить китайский язык он должен был быть назначен Руководителем резидентуры ЦРУ в Пекине, но после терактов 11ого сентября он был назначен руководителем Управлений по борьбе с распространением ОМУ оружия массового уничтожения Оперативного Директората ЦРУ  а в 2004 он стал Руководителем Подразделений Западная Европа а в 2005 ушел из ЦРУ из за несогоачиях с Портер Госсом новый руководитель ЦРУ и был назначен Руководителем разведки и контрразведи Госдепартамента энергетики.

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen's career

 

Joined CIA in 1982.

Case officer in Stockholm from 1984 to 1987.

Case officer in CIA Station in Moscow from 1988 to 1990. Officially Mowatt-Larssen was member of the political section inside the US Embassy.

Case officer (Or Deputy Station Chief, or Station Chief???) in Athens, from 1990 to 1992.

Deputy Chief of Station in CIA Moscow Station from 1992 to 1994, officially first secretary of the political section of the US Embassy.He was in charge of officials contacts with SVR ( Russian foreign intelligence service).

After, James L.Morris, CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, his boss, was expelled , Mowatt is promoted as Acting Chief of Station, but replaced by Michaël Sulick as head of CIA Station

Chief of Base in Zurich from 1994 to 1996

Chief of station in Oslo from 1998 to 2000. 

He works with George Tenet (CIA Director) but  in mid-2001 he begins to learn Chinese, to be posted as CIA Station Chief in Beijing.But after the 9/11 events, Mowatt was named as  DO CPD CIA Director ( Counterproliferation Division of the CIA 's Directorate of Opérations).

 In 2004 , named as West European Division Chief. but he disagrees Goss's (The new CIA Director) politic about the Agency and resigns. Promoted as Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the US Department of Energy.

 

 

Le livre vert de l'IRA

Le "livre vert" est un manuel de l'IRA, Irish Republican Army, sur la conduite que doivent adopter les membres de l'organisation dans le cadre de leurs activités.

 

 

Irish Republican Army
 
The Green Book I
 
Commitment to the Republican Movement is the firm belief that its struggle both military and political is morally justified, that war is morally justified and that the Army is the direct representative of the 1918 Dail Eireann Parliament, and that as such they are the legal and lawful government of the Irish Republic, which has the moral right to pass laws for, and to claim jurisdiction over the territory, air space, mineral resources, means of production, distribution and exchange and all of its people regardless of creed or loyalty.
The most important thing is security. That means you:
 
DON`T TALK IN PUBLIC PLACES:
 
YOU DON`T TELL YOUR FAMILY, FRIENDS, GIRLFRIENDS OR WORKMATES THAT YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE I.R.A. DON`T EXPRESS VIEWS ABOUT MILITARY MATTERS, IN OTHER WORDS YOU SAY NOTHING to any person. Don’t be seen in public marches, demonstrations or protests. Don’t be seen in the company of known Republicans, don’t frequent known Republican houses. Your prime duty is to remain unknown to the enemy forces and the public at large.
 
Another important thing volunteers must realise and understand is the danger in drinking alcohol and the very real danger of over-drinking. Quite a large body of information has been gathered in the past by enemy forces and their touts from volunteers who drank.Volunteers are warned that drink-induced loose talk is the MOST POTENTIAL DANGER facing any organisation, and in a military organisation it is SUICIDE.
 
[The recruit learns from Day One that:]
 
The Irish Republican Army, as the legal representatives of the Irish people, are morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance against foreign occupation forces and domestic collaborators. All volunteers are and must feel morally justified in carrying out the dictates of the legal government; they as the Army are the legal and lawful Army of the Irish Republic which has been forced underground by overwhelming forces.
 
The Army as an organisation claims and expects your total allegiance without reservation. It enters into every aspect of your life. It invades the privacy of your home life, it fragments your family and friends, in other words claims your total allegiance.All potential volunteers must realise that the threat of capture and of long jail sentences are a very real danger and a shadow which hangs over every volunteer. Many in the past have joined the Army out of romantic notions, or sheer adventure, but when captured and jailed they had after-thoughts about their allegiance to the Army. They realised at too late a stage that they had no real interest in being volunteers. This causes splits and dissension inside prisons and divided families and neighbours outside. Another important aspect all potential volunteers should think about is their ability to obey orders from a superior officer. All volunteers must obey orders issued to them by a superior officer whether they like the particular officer or not.
 
Before any potential volunteer decides to join the Irish Republican Army he should understand fully and clearly the issues involved. He should not join the Army because of emotionalism, sensationalism, or adventurism. He should examine fully his own motives, knowing the dangers involved and knowing that he will find no romance within the Movement. Again he should examine his political motives bearing in mind that the Army are intent on creating a Socialist Republic.
 
Volunteers are expected to wage a military war of liberation against a numerically superior force. This involves the use of arms and explosives. Firstly the use of arms. When volunteers are trained in the use of arms they must fully understand that guns are dangerous, and their main purpose is to take human life, in other words to kill people, and volunteers are trained to kill people. It is not an easy thing to take up a gun and go out to kill some person without strong convictions or justification. The Army, its motivating force, is based upon strong convictions which bonds the Army into one force and before any potential volunteer decides to join the Army he must have these strong convictions. Convictions which are strong enough to give him confidence to kill someone without hesitation and without regret. Again all people wishing to join the Army must fully realise that when life is being taken, that very well could mean their own. If you go out to shoot soldiers or police you must fully realise that they too can shoot you.Life in an underground army is extremely harsh and hard, cruel and disillusioning at times. So before any person decides to join the Army he should think seriously about the whole thing.
 
The nationhood of all Ireland has been an accepted fact for more than 1,000 years and has been recognised internationally as a fact. Professor Edmund Curtis, writing of Ireland in 800 AD says that ‘she was the first nation North of the Alps to produce a whole body of literature in her own speech’, and he is told how the Danes were driven out or assimilated by a people ‘whose civilisation was a shining light throughout Europe’, prior to the Norman invasion of 1169 with which there ‘commenced more than 8 centuries of RELENTLESS AND UNREMITTING WARFARE that has lasted down to this very day’.
 
The objective of the 800 years of oppression ‘is economic exploitation with the unjustly partitioned 6 counties remaining Britain’s directly controlled old-style colony’ and the South under the ‘continuing social, cultural, and economic domination of London’. This last led to Irish savings being invested in England ‘for a higher interest rate’ and many hundreds of thousands of boys and girls from this country had to emigrate to England to seek the employment which those exported savings created.
 
Another aspect of economic imperialism at work is the export of raw, unprocessed materials: live cattle on the hoof, mineral wealth, fish caught by foreign trawlers etc. Further, from 1958 on, the Free State abandoned all attempts to secure an independent economy, and brought in foreign multi-national companies to create jobs instead of buying their skills and then sending them home gradually.
 
‘Africanisation’ is the word for this process elsewhere. Control of our affairs in all of Ireland lies more than ever since 1921 outside the hands of the Irish people.
 
The logical outcome of all this was the full immersion in the E.E.C. in the 1970’s. The Republican Movement opposed this North and South in 1972 and 1975 and continues to do so. It is against such political economic power blocks East and West and military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It stands with our Celtic brothers and the other subject nations of Europe, and with the neutral and non-aligned peoples of the Third World; it seeks a third, socialist alternative which transcends both Western individualistic capitalism and Eastern state capitalism, which is in accordance with our best revolutionary traditions as a people.
 
The position of the Irish Republican Army since its foundation in 1916 has been one of sustained resistance and implacable hostility to the forces of imperialism, always keeping in the forefront of the most advanced revolutionary thinking and the latest guerrilla warfare techniques in the world.
 
The milestones, the battle honours won, the bloodstained trail of sacrifice, imprisonment, hunger strikes, executions, yet with telling blows delivered to the enemy, often in the heart of British imperialism itself, commanding the open admiration of freedom-loving peoples around the world.
 
Note: The moral position of the Irish Republican Army, its right to engage in warfare, is based on:
 
a) The right to resist foreign aggression
 
b) The right to revolt against tyranny and oppression
 
c) The direct lineal succession with the Provisional Government of 1916, the first Dail of 1919 and the second Dail of 1921.
 
In 1938 the seven surviving faithful Republican Deputies delegated executive powers to the Army Council of the I.R.A. as per the 1921 resolution. In 1969 the sole surviving Deputy, Joseph Clarke, reaffirmed publicly that the then Provisional Army Council and its successors were the inheritors of the first and second Dail as a Provisional Government.
 
Economic imperialism is evident on every main road and city street of Ireland: in Banking, Insurance, Merchant Marine, the Motor Industry, Mining, Fisheries, Industry in general, I.C.I., cultural imperialism epitomised in the Conor Cruise O’Briens of this Island, has been reinforced since the Treaty sell-out by successive Free State Governments via mass media, R.T.E., and the press and through education.
 
The injustice of being as an individual politically impotent, the injustice of unemployment, poverty, poor housing, inadequate social security, the injustice of the exploitation of our labour, our intelligence and our natural resources, the injustice of the bloody-minded destruction of our culture, our language, music, art, drama, customs, the inherent injustice of the state repression which is necessary to maintain the present system as a whole.
 
[So long as partition lasts a unified national concentration on correcting these injustices is not possible. ‘We must therefore first of all break the British connection’. The I.R.A. promises a democratic and socialist state]:
 
A Government system which will give every individual the opportunity to partake in the decisions which will affect him or her: by decentralising political power to the smallest social unit practicable where we would all have the opportunity to wield political power both individually and collectively in the interests of ourselves and the nation as a whole. Socially and Economically we will enact a policy aimed at eradicating the Social Imperialism of today, by returning the ownership of the wealth of Ireland to the people of Ireland through a system of co-operativism, worker ownership, and control of the industry, Agriculture and the Fisheries.
 
Culturally we would hope to restore Gaelic, not from the motivation of national chauvinism but from the viewpoint of achieving with the aid of a cultural revival the distinctive new Irish Socialist State: as a Bulwark against imperialist encroachments from whatever quarter. Internationally our alignment would hopefully be with the progressive Governments or former colonies like ourselves with the dual purpose of mutual advantage and of curbing the endeavours of imperialistic military and economic power blocs throughout the world.
 
A new recruit’s immediate obstacle is the removal of his (her) ignorance about how to handle weapons, military tactics, security, interrogations etc. An O.C.’s might be how to put a unit on a military footing; an I.O.’s how to create an effective intelligence network; a Cumann Chairman’s how best to mount a campaign on a given issue, e.g. H Blocks etc., and for all members of the movement regardless of which branch we belong to, to enhance our commitment to and participation in the struggle through gaining as comprehensive an understanding as possible of our present society and the proposed Republican alternative through self and group education.
 
Before we go on the offensive politically or militarily we take the greatest defensive precautions possible to ensure success, e.g. we do not advocate a United Ireland without being able to justify our right to such a state as opposed to partition; we do not employ revolutionary violence as our means without being able to illustrate that we have no recourse to any other means. Or in more everyday simple terms: we do not claim that we are going to escalate the war if we cannot do just that; we do not mount an operation without first having ensured that we have taken the necessary defensive precautions of accurate intelligence, security, that weapons are in proper working order with proper ammunition and that the volunteers involved know how to handle interrogations in the event of their capture etc., and of course that the operation itself enhances rather than alienates our supporters.
 
Even the given situations of adequate bomb warnings are exploited which is again our mistake in not having sufficiently considered our defensive before going on the offensive: the so-called Bloody Friday being the prime example. Either we did not stop to consider that the enemy would ‘Dirty Joe’ us on the warnings or we overestimated the Brits’ ability to handle so many operations. But regardless of which is the case we made the mistake and the enemy exploited it.
 
Other more everyday examples: the enemy exploits the mistake of a volunteer who stays in his own home by arresting him; he exploits the careless dumping of war materials by lifting them or, as is the most recent tactic, by assassinating volunteers who return to pick the materials up; he exploits I.R.A.-sticky [Official IRA] confrontations by staying out of the way to allow the subsequent detrimental publicity and effect on support to run its course; he exploits I.R.A.- Loyalist confrontations by moving in behind the I.R.A. unit and attacking it, plus again the detrimental international publicity.
 
We exploit the enemy’s mistakes by propagating the facts. So it was with their murderous mistakes of the Falls Road curfew, Bloody Sunday and internment, which were exploited to our advantage support-wise as was the murder of John Boyle in Dunloy.
 
Tactics are dictated by the existing conditions. Here again the logic is quite simple. Without support Volunteers, Dumps, Weapons, Finance, etc., we cannot mount an operation, much less a campaign. In September 1969 the existing conditions dictated that the Brits were not to be shot, but after the Falls curfew all Brits were to the people acceptable targets. The existing conditions had been changed.
 
Likewise at present, for example, although the leadership of the S.D.L.P. has proved itself to be collaborationist and thus an enemy of the people, at various stages since 1974 we could have employed the tactic of making them subjects of ridicule by tarring and feathering them when for instance they were members of an Executive which tortured and interned Irishmen, which penalised rent and rates strikers etc., or when they recently declared at Westminster in a debate on H Block that ‘ Life should mean Life and there should be no Political Status’. The defensive precaution in the latter example being of course that the people be made aware beforehand that they actually did make such an utterance.
 
The rule of thumb for all our actions can therefore be clearly seen to be that we must explain by whatever means we have at our disposal why we bomb, why we punish criminals, why we execute informers etc.
 
We do not exclude taking an action which does not completely fill the criteria of this analysis on how to conduct the struggle. Many instances have arisen and will arise again when we have had to step outside these general terms of reference to our immediate detriment propaganda-wise and support-wise. However even in such an eventuality, if we rationalise our action, get our defensive before our offensive, try to ensure that we have an alternative, relatively unaffected area of support from which to operate if the support in the area which the detrimental but unavoidable action takes place, we are adhering as best as possible under the circumstances to a proper conduct of the war.
 
THE ENEMY: CATEGORISE - CURE:
 
The enemy, generally speaking, are all those opposed to our short-term or long-term objectives. But having said that, we must realise that all our enemies are not the same and therefore there is no common cure for their enmity. The conclusion then is that we must categorise and then suggest cures for each category.Some examples: We have enemies through ignorance, through our own fault or default and of course the main enemy is the establishment.
 
The enemy through ignorance we attempt to cure through education though such an attempt is obviously futile if we do not firstly educate ourselves. Our means are marches, demonstrations, wall slogans, press statements, Republican press and publications and of course person-to-person communication. But as has already been stated, we must first educate ourselves, we must organise the protests and demonstrations efficiently, we must be prepared to paint the wall slogans and to sell and contribute to Republican press, Publications and Press statements.
 
The enemy through our own fault or default is the one we create ourselves through our personal conduct and through our collective conduct of the struggle: the wee woman whose gate or back door gets pulled off its hinges by a volunteer evading arrest and who doesn’t get an apology as soon as possible afterwards or more preferably has the damage repaired by one of our supporters; the family and neighbours of a criminal or informer who has been punished without their being informed why. In brief our personal conduct as well as our conduct of our Republican activities must be aimed at if not enhancing support, at least not creating enemies unnecessarily.
 
The establishment is all those who have a vested interest in maintaining the present status quo in politicians, media, judiciary, certain business elements and the Brit war machine compromising the Brit Army, U.D.R., R.U.C. ( r ) [reserve], Screws, Civilian Searchers. The cure for these armed branches of the establishment is well known and documented. But with the possible exceptions of the Brit Ministers in the ‘Northern Ireland Office’ and certain members of the judiciary, the overtly unarmed branches of the establishment are not so clearly identifiable to the people as our enemies as say armed Brits or R.U.C.
 
It is our task therefore to clearly identify them to the people as such and again depending on the existing conditions and our ability to get our defensive before our defensive, effect a cure. Execution, as earlier stated is not the only way of making this category of establishment enemy ineffective: we can variously expose them as liars, hypocrites, collaborators, make them subjects of ridicule etc., e.g. The ‘Mason-Superthug’ poster image, the ‘Captain Nervewreck’ cartoon strip, the Conor ‘Booze’ O’Brien pun etc.
 
GUERILLA STRATEGY:
 
Many figures of speech have been used to describe Guerrilla Warfare, one of the most apt being ‘The War of the Flea’ which conjured up the image of a flea harrying a creature of by comparison elephantine size into fleeing (forgive the pun). Thus it is with a Guerrilla Army such as the I.R.A. which employs hit and run tactics against the Brits while at the same time striking at the soft economic underbelly of the enemy, not with the hope of physically driving them into the sea but nevertheless expecting to effect their withdrawal by an effective campaign of continuing harassment contained in a fivefold guerrilla strategy.
 
The strategy is:
 
1. A War of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal.
 
2. A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s financial interest in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing long term financial investment in our country.
 
3. To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past several years ungovernable except by colonial military rule.
 
4. To sustain the war and gain support for its end by National and International propaganda and publicity campaigns.
 
5. By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and informers.
 
While one of our chief considerations in deciding tactics is the concern for our friends, relatives, neighbours, our people in the midst of whom we operate, the enemy is simply dealing with an impersonal, inferior foreigner, a ‘Paddy’, ‘Musck-Savage’ or ‘Bog-Wog’, and with the great added advantage of all the resources and back up of a conventional army, para-military police, etc., e.g. M.R.F., S.A.S., plain clothes units, covert surveillance teams etc. At this juncture the most obvious differences between the Brits and the I.R.A. volunteer, apart from the fact that the Brit is an uninvited armed foreigner who has no moral or historical justification for being here in the first place, are those of support, motivation and freedom of personal initiative. The Brits support, his billets, dumps, weapons, wages, etc., are all as stated earlier provided for by involuntary taxation. His people who pay the taxes have never indicated nor indeed have they been asked to indicate by any democratic means their assent to his being here at their expense. The I.R.A. volunteer receives all his support voluntarily from his people.
 
A member of the I.R.A. is such by his own choice, his convictions being the only factor which compels him to volunteer, his objectives the political freedom and social and economic justice for his people. Apart from the few minutes in the career of the average Brit that he comes under attack, the Brit has no freedom or personal initiative. He is told when to sleep, where to sleep, when to get up, where to spend his free time, etc.
 
The I.R.A. volunteer, except when carrying out a specific army task, acts most of the time on his own initiative and must therefore shoulder that responsibility in such a way that he enhances our necessary stated task of ensuring that his conduct is not a contributory factor to the Brit attempt to isolate us from our people.
 
By now it is clear that our task is not only to kill as many enemy personnel as possible but of equal importance to create support which will carry us not only through a war of liberation which could last another decade but which will support us pas t the ‘Brits Out’ stage to the ultimate aim of a Democratic Socialist Republic.
 
Resistance must be channelled into active and passive support with an on-going process through our actions, our education programmes, our policies, of attempting to turn the passive supporter into a dump holder, a member of the movement, a paper seller etc., with the purpose of building protective support barriers between the enemy and ourselves, thus curbing the enemy’s attempted isolation policy. And of course the more barriers there are, the harder it is for the enemy to get at us while at the same time we increase the potential for active support in its various forms.
 
The immediate protective barriers are of course, our own security, the other branches of the movement, our billets, etc. But we must build up other barriers by championing the various causes in our support areas through involvement in the various enemy structures which have been brought down as a result of the war: Policing, Transport, Bin-Collection, Advice-Centres, etc. The alternative to our plotting such a course is obvious. IF, for example, we have an area with a unit of I.R.A. volunteers and nothing else: No Sinn Fein Cumann, no Green Cross committee, no local involvement, etc., after a period, regardless of how successfully they have been against the Brits, they end up in jail leaving no structures behind: no potential for resistance, recruits, education or general enhancing of support.
 
[It will be seen from the foregoing that despite all the political and military training and advice, the recruit must be warned that jail is something he will almost inevitably experience. Interrogations are frequently simulated in training to increase the volunteers’ awareness of what confronts them, which brings us to Green Book II]
 
 

Irish Republican Army
 
The Green Book II
 
Volunteers Oath
"I do solemnly promise to uphold and have belief in the objectives of the IRA and obey all orders issued to me by the Army Council and all my superior officers"
 
ANTI-INTERROGATION
 
I. ARREST
Most volunteers are arrested on or as a result of a military operation. This causes an initial shock resulting in tension and anxiety. All volunteers feel that they have failed, resulting in a deep sense of disappointment. The police are aware of this feeling of disappointment and act upon this weakness by insults such as “you did not do very well: you are only an amateur: you are only second-class or worse”. While being arrested the police use heavy-handed `shock` tactics in order to frighten the prisoner and break down his resistance. The prisoner is usually dragged along the road to the waiting police wagon, flung into it, followed by the arresting personnel, e.g., police or Army. On the journey to the detention centre the prisoner is kicked, punched and the insults start. On arrival he is dragged from the police wagon through a gauntlet of kicks, punches and insults and flung into a cell.
 
What A Volunteer Should Do When Arrested
 
1. The most important thing to bear in mind when arrested is that you are a volunteer of a revolutionary Army, that you have been captured by an enemy force, that your cause is a just one, that you are right and that the enemy is wrong and that as a soldier you have taken the chance expected of a soldier and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in being captured.
 
2. You must bear in mind that the treatment meted out to you is designed to break you and so bleed you of all the information you may have with regard to the organisation to which you belong.
 
3. They will attempt to intimidate you by sheer numbers and by brutality. Volunteers who may feel disappointed are entering the first dangerous threshold because the police will act upon this disappointment to the detriment of the volunteer and to the furtherment of their own ends. Volunteers must condition themselves that they can be arrested and if and when arrested they should expect the worse and be prepared for it.
 
II. INTERROGATION
 
After the prisoner has been placed in a cell, he may be left for some time alone. During this lull, police officers, `The Interrogators`, will crowd around the outside of the cell door from time to time, shouting threats and insults, telling the prisoner what they will do to him when they go into the cell.
 
After some time the interrogators will enter the cell and ask the prisoner to make a confession. During this period he may be subjected to assaults and abusive language, depending on the circumstances surrounding the charge. At this stage he will be fingerprinted and other questions will be put to him, related to the specific charge or other charges. Usually his name and address will be taken, place of employment, occupation, educational standard and so forth. After this he will be again isolated in his cell while his `interrogators` check his identity, usually with local police, his home and place of employment. In this period of time the police will attempt to establish his political beliefs, if any, his associates, his police record, if any, and in this way build up a file on him.
 
Most probably `his associates` and general pattern of movement will give a pretty good idea to the police, if the person is involved in or is sympathetic to a political organisation. Armed with this body of information the police will re-enter the cell and accuse the prisoner of all sorts of activity. If the evidence does not indicate a degree of guilt on the specific charge, he will be accused of all kinds of vague activity.
 
The purpose of these vague accusations is to implant a feeling of guilt in the prisoner. If, however, the police have some evidence or strong beliefs, linking him with a specific charge, pressure will be applied immediately. This pressure will take the form of physical and psychological torture, most probably he will be punched and kicked around the cell while they scream at him to make a confession, indicating to him that they know all. One or more of the interrogating officers will act in a particular and brutal manner, if they fail to get a confession or on admission of guilt they will leave the cell, telling the prisoner they will be back and threatening him with the most barbaric forms of torture, implying that they extracted confessions from better men than he.
 
Another set of interrogators will enter the cell, possibly carrying a file with the prisoner’s name written on it. They will act quite friendly and sympathetic towards him, telling him that they do not condone the activity of the previous interrogators, that they were mad, crazy and possibly they will kill him when they come in later, they will go to extremes to impress the prisoner of their own sympathy towards him, and ask him to make a confession to them indicating that they do not want the previous interrogators `to get at him again`.
 
They will probably guarantee him that if he makes the confession they will not allow the former interrogators to re-enter the cell, this will be coupled with a warning that otherwise th