14.05.2008
Polémique: Richard Dwyer et la secte de Jim Jones.
Il est temps de briser un mythe sur un des scandales les plus retentissants su siècle dernier. Tous les ingrédients étaient la: Une secte dirigée par un fou, l'apparition de la CIA, laquelle était sous les feux des commissions parlementaires américaines Pike et Church, sans oublier l'assassinat, rare dans les annales, d'un parlementaire américain, Leo Ryan, venu enquêter sur place, au Guyana. Apparition de la CIA? Tout a fait. Parmi les personnes qui accompagnèrent le parlementaire Léo Ryan dans sa visite du camp de la secte de Jim Jones, se trouvait un dénommé Richard Dwyer.
De gauche a droite: Jim Jones, Charles Garry et Richard Dwyer
Or selon le site "Seize the night" (Je cite ce site mais il y en a d'autres): "Dwyer was an agent of the CIA. Richard Dwyer was a CIA agent For his part, Dwyer neither confirms nor denies that he was a CIA agent, but he was identified in the 1968 edition of Who's Who inthe CIA. A month after the massacre the San Mateo Times, a Bay Areanewspaper (hometown paper of Leo Ryan), reported that "State Department officials acknowledge that a CIA agent was dispatched to Jonestown within minutes of the airstrip assault." Dwyer denied to the Times that he was there at the time. According to one report, Dwyer's next stop after Guyana was Grenada". Notons que ce site n'est pas le seul: Une très sérieuse dépêche de UPI du 04.08.1981 (reproduite en fin d'article) affirme elle aussi que Dwyer est un officier de la CIA tout comme deux autres personnes dont elle donne le nom.
Reprenons les éléments. Selon l'auteur, Dwyer est un officier de la CIA car identifié comme tel par un ouvrage de Julius Mader, ouvrage sorti en Allemagne de l'Est (ca l'auteur oublie de le préciser) et intitulé "Who's who de la CIA". Un peu léger de se baser sur une seule source d'information non recoupée. Et si des membres du Département d'Etat ont reconnus que un officier de la CIA était présent, cela ne prouve pas automatiquement que il s'agissait de Dwyer. Surtout que aucune enquête sérieuse ni même la CIA n'ont jamais reconnus ont constatés que Dwyer était un officier du renseignement américain.
Il devenait par conséquent nécéssaire de déclencher des recherches, collecter des informations, analyser, pour tirer la situation au clair, en démarrant par la technique la plus simple pour identifier un officier présumé de la CIA:Sa biographie. C'est le Washington Post du 31.08.1991 , assisté du site Namebase, qui permettent d'en savoir plus.
Né vers 1933, Richard Alan Dwyer obtient un diplôme d'administration publique a l'université de Princeton, a l'école des affaires publiques et internationales, avant d'entrer au Département d'Etat en 1957. Dans le cadre de sa carrière, il a servi en Syrie, de 1960 a 1963, en Egypte de 1963 a 1966, en Bulgarie de 1970 a 1972 , au Tchad de 1976 a 1977 et était en poste en Guyana en 1978. Notons que selon le Washington Post (ce détail a de l'importance) , aux deux derniers postes a l'étranger, il était chargé d'affaires et chef de mission adjoint. Ensuite, il est consul général en Martinique. Il quitte le service actif en 1984 et décède le 29.08.1991.
Maintenant utilisons la méthode du "spotting" des opérateurs de la CIA pour vérifier si Dwyer correspond aux critères du chef de station, ou du moins d'un "opérateur" de la CIA. Est ce que Dwyer a utilisé une couverture d'un officier de la CIA? Réponse négative. Malgré nombre de recherches, je n'ai jamais vu un officier de la CIA utiliser la couverture de chargé d'affaires. Les "couvertures" des officiers traitants de la CIA sont données par le Département d'Etat, le Ministère des affaires étrangères US, les officiers de la CIA ne peuvent se les attribuer. Or jamais un officier de la CIA n'a occupé cette couverture de chargé d'affaires.Sa biographie ressemble beaucoup plus a celle d'un classique diplomate, loin du fantasme des "espions de la CIA a chaque coin de rue". Ajoutons-y que la couverture d'un officier de la CIA dans une ambassade permet de montrer son imoortance hiérarchique. Un officier de la CIA qui est officiellement conseiller d'ambassade (ou parfois 1er secrétaire d'ambassade) est sans aucun doute le chef de poste. L'officier CIA clairement identifié dans un pays qui a la couverture de 1er secrétaire, par exemple, est son adjoint, et ainsi de suite. Si Dwyer était "chargé d'affaire" et "chef de mission adjoint" (poste diplomatiquement plus élevé que conseiller) il devrait être le chef du poste de la CIA a Jonestown. Or et d'une je n'ai jamais vu aucun officier de la CIA occuper une telle couverture, et de deux, le chef de poste de la CIA a Jonestown a l'époque était clairement identifié: Il se nomme James Adkins. Cet officier de la CIA a la carrière bien remplie terminera sa carrière avec le scandale de l'Irangate sur le dos..
Copyright 1991 The Washington Post The Washington Post August 31, 1991, Saturday, Final Edition SECTION: METRO; PAGE B4 LENGTH: 337 words HEADLINE: Foreign Service Officer Richard A. Dwyer Dies SERIES: Occasional BODY: Richard Alan Dwyer, 58, a retired Foreign Service officer who received the State Department's Award for Valor for his actions in Guyana during the 1978 Jonestown massacre, died Aug. 29 at Sibley Memorial Hospital of complications after gall bladder surgery. Mr. Dwyer joined the Foreign Service in Washington in 1957, and he retired in 1984. In retirement, he had been an investment adviser. At his death, he was director of the Metropolitan Washington Council of the National Association of Investors Corporation and led its computer group. A resident of Washington, he was born in Evanston, Ill., and graduated from Dartmouth College. He received a master's degree in public administration from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. His Foreign Service career included posts in Syria, Egypt and Bulgaria. He had been deputy chief of mission and charge d'affairs at U.S. embassies in Chad and Guyana. His last post before retiring was consul general for the French Caribbean in Martinique. His Award for Valor was for action taken in November 1978, when members of the cult settlement at Jonestown in Guyana attacked a group led by Rep. Leo Ryan (D-Calif.) at the Port Kaiturna airstrip, which was the supply point for the settlement. Ryan, who was investigating reports that some of his constituents were being coerced to remain in the settlement, was killed in the attack, as were three television journalists. Mr. Dwyer, who had been Ryan's embassy escort, was wounded, but nevertheless led the survivors into the nearby jungle, where they hid from further attack. They were rescued the next day, the same day the mass suicide that killed more than 900 members of the cult settlement was discovered. Mr. Dwyer was a member of DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired) and St. Thomas Apostle Catholic Church in Washington. Survivors include his wife of 33 years, Sara Height Dwyer, and two children, Elizabeth and Timothy Dwyer, all of Washington.
Copyright 1981 U.P.I. United Press International August 4, 1981, Tuesday, AM cycle SECTION: Domestic News LENGTH: 420 words HEADLINE: Layton's lawyers ask for CIA documents BYLINE: By SPENCER SHERMAN DATELINE: SAN FRANCISCO BODY: The question of CIA involvement in the 1978 Peoples Temple mass murder-suicide surfaced in the conspiracy trial of Larry Layton Tuesday when defense attorneys argued for access to secret intelligence files. U.S. District Judge Robert F. Peckham interrupted jury selection to hear arguments from defense attorney Tony Tamburello and CIA Attorney Page Moffet on releasing intelligence files concerning the shooting of Congressman Leo Ryan. Tamburello said he should be allowed access to CIA files on the tragedy because ''we feel that the CIA's role was active in preventing any intervention by government authorities'' to halt the shooting and the deaths of 914 temple members. Tamburello asked the intelligence agency to reveal whether U.S. Ambassador to Guyana John Burke and aides Richard McCoy, Daniel Weber and Richard Dwyer were CIA operatives in Guyana. Tamburello charged the government with ignoring reports that Peoples Temple leader Jim Jones was running a ''concentration camp'' in the jungle because of the CIA's role in propping up the government of Forbes Burnham. The cult headquarters was strategically located near the disputed border of Guyana and Venezuela and, Tamburello charged, the Peoples Temple Agricultural Compound was used as a buffer zone between the Guyanese and Venezualians. Moffet, speaking on a conference line from Washington D.C., said he was not sure ''how any CIA involvement would relate to the guilt or innocence of Larry Layton.'' Tamburello seemed to argue the CIA's failure to warn of an impending tragedy made them a party to it through the legal theory of contributory negligence which places liability on someone who negligently causes a crime. ''I believe the CIA is directly responsible for creating the Jonestown situation by allowing Mr. Jones, through the government of Guyana, from acting the way he did,'' Tamburello said. Layton is charged with conspiring to murder Rep. Ryan, D-Calif., and U.S. Chief of Missions Dwyer at the Port Kaituma airstrip. Three journalists and a temple defector also were killed in the attack. Layton can be charged with conspiring in the attempt on Dwyer's life because a diplomat is an internationally protected person, allowing the government to prosecute for a crime which occurs outside the United States. ''If Richard Dwyer was with the CIA it might very well effect whether he is an internationally protected person,'' Tamburello said. Peckham said he would consider the question and issue an opinion later.
10.04.2008
Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007
Voila un document fort intéréssant qui vient d'être publié et que je recommande vivement. Cette analyse de 113 pages non seulement dévoile des cas peu connus de citoyens américains ayant fournis des informations a des services secrets étrangers (par exemple, russes, philippins, nord-coréens), mais en plus livre une analyse détaillée, et compare les différentes situations? Combien de personnes ont trahis, pour quelles raisons? Quelle était leur situation sociale, familiale? Et j'en passe. Un document en anglais qui rappele l'évolution du contexte historique depuis 1947 jusque 2007,réellement passionant. Disponible ici
19.02.2008
La CIA abandonne son programme des "immersions profondes".
L'information vient tout droit du Los Angeles Times, journal américain généralement bien informé sur les questions de renseignement: La CIA vient d'abandonner son programme dit des "immersions profondes".
De quoi s'agit-il? Un officier de la CIA en poste a l'étranger utilise généralement une couverture diplomatique ou consulaire pour ses activités d'espionnage dans le pays qui l'accueille. Il est donc amené, en tant que diplomate, a rencontrer d'autres diplomates, industriels, économistes, hommes politiques...Un domaine qui ne permet pas d'infiltrer et de neutraliser les cellules de groupes terroristes. Consciente de cette faille, au lendemain du 11 septembre, la CIA décide de développer son programme NOC (Non Official Cover). Il s'agit d'implanter dans des pays autres que les Etats-Unis des officiers de la CIA au sein d'entreprises , avec pour but qu'ils infiltrent les groupes terroristes. Il est en effet plus facile, moins soupconneux, d'être un entrepreneur ou un industriel que un diplomate, les ambassades ayant la réputation (mais la réputation seulement ) d'être des nids d'officiers de la CIA.
L'utilisation de NOC n'est pas une première au sein de la CIA, ou de tout autre service secret. Tout service secret utilise, pour ses missions, des couvertures commerciales ou industrielles par exemples. Reste en mémoire le BND (Renseignement extérieur de la République Fédérale allemande) et le Guojia Anquanbu (Renseignement et contre-espionnage chinois) qui utilisent très souvent cette couverture. Notons aussi que la CIA a déja utilisé ses couvertures NOC pour des opérations d'espionnage économique: Elle a instauré des officiers sous NOC a la fin des années 80 au Japon, et reste en mémoire le cas de Mary Ann Baumgartner, cette "représentante de société" qui tenta de recruter en France un haut fonctionnaire, Henri Plagnol , scandale rendu public en 1995 et qui entraîna l'expulsion entre autres de Baumgartner et du chef de station de la CIA a Paris Richard Holm.
Cette opération de la CIA ,ou ont été crées de 2002 a 2004 12 sociétés permanentes, masquant des officiers de la CIA, en Europe, ou sont implantées tout comme d'autres régions du monde des cellules terroristes, avait pour but d'infiltrer ses dernières. Des moyens financiers considérables (On parle de centaines de millions de dollars) ont été mis en oeuvre pour l'implantation des entreprises et le renforcement de la couverture des officiers de la CIA NOC.
Mais l'opération a échouée. En effet, les terroristes ne fréquentent ni les cocktails diplomatiques, ni le monde des affaires , exception faite pour les financiers du terrorisme.
Il faut y ajouter l'opposition , dans certains cas, de l'utilisation du NOC. L'article donne en exemple le chef de la station de la CIA a Riyad qui a refusé qu'on envoie en Arabie Saoudite un officier en NOC, lequel était invité a une conférence sur l'énérgie a Riyad. Ou les critiques dans l'approche des NOC faite par Rolf-Mowatt-Larssen, alors chef de la Division Europe de la Direction des Opérations de la CIA.
Un des dangers du NOC, il est vrai, est l'absence de couverture efficace en cas d'arrestation. Un officier de la CIA sous couverture diplomatique arrêté pour espionnage risque seulement d'être expulsé; un officier NOC la prison , avec les risques dans certains pays du globe d'être torturé, et d'avouer, racontant les méthodes et les cibles de la CIA,voire le dévoilement du réseau NOC dans son ensemble.
Notons aussi que une des firmes a vu sa couverture bousillée quand il a été rendu public en 2003 que Valérie Plame, une officier du WINPAC (La division chargée de l'analyse des informations en matière d'armement, et entre autres d'ADM) de la CIA était une fonctionnaire de la CIA travaillant sous couverture de la firme "Brewster Jennings & Associates".
Toutefois, selon l'article, sur les 12 sociétés, 10 seulement ont été fermées. Quid des deux dernières? Auraient-elles atteints leur but? La question se pose.
Une solution pour pallier l'inefficacité du dispositif antiterroriste? Le recrutement d'informateurs, toujours, mais aussi d' "access agents" , des personnes ne détenant pas d'informations secrètes mais qui ont des contacts dans les milieux intéréssant un service secret. Ses "access agents" , en tant que citoyens d"un pays tiers, ont plus de latitude pour entretenir des contacts, présenter a un "case officer" (officier traitant) des personnes l'intéréssant, qui pourront éventuellement être recrutées. Une autre possibilité, évoquée dans l'article, est de modifier la stratégie des NOC, en visant et créant les organisations caritatives pour les étudiants musulmans, par exemple.
Article du Los Angeles Times
CIA's ambitious post-9/11 spy plan crumbles
WASHINGTON -- The CIA set up a network of front companies in Europe and elsewhere after the Sept. 11 attacks as part of a constellation of "black stations" for a new generation of spies, according to current and former agency officials.
But after spending hundreds of millions of dollars setting up as many as 12 of the companies, the agency shut down all but two after concluding they were ill-conceived and poorly positioned for gathering intelligence on the CIA's principal targets: terrorist groups and unconventional weapons proliferation networks.
The closures were a blow to two of the CIA's most pressing priorities after the 2001 terrorist attacks: expanding its overseas presence and changing the way it deploys spies.
The companies were the centerpiece of an ambitious plan to increase the number of case officers sent overseas under what is known as "nonofficial cover," meaning they would pose as employees of investment banks, consulting firms or other fictitious enterprises with no apparent ties to the U.S. government.
But the plan became the source of significant dispute within the agency and was plagued with problems, officials said. The bogus companies were located far from Muslim enclaves in Europe and other targets. Their size raised concerns that one mistake would blow the cover of many agents. And because business travelers don't ordinarily come into contact with Al Qaeda or other high-priority adversaries, officials said, the cover didn't work.
Summing up what many considered the fatal flaw of the program, one former high-ranking CIA official said, "They were built on the theory of the 'Field of Dreams': Build them and the targets will come."
Officials said the experience reflected an ongoing struggle at the CIA to adapt to a new environment in espionage. The agency has sought to regroup by designing covers that would provide pretexts for spies to get close to radical Muslim groups, nuclear equipment manufacturers and other high-priority targets.
But current and former officials say progress has been painfully slow, and that the agency's efforts to alter its use of personal and corporate disguises have yet to produce a significant penetration of a terrorist or weapons proliferation network.
"I don't believe the intelligence community has made the fundamental shift in how it operates to adapt to the different targets that are out there," said Rep. Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee.
The cover arrangements most commonly employed by the CIA "don't get you near radical Islam," Hoekstra said, adding that six years after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, "We don't have nearly the kind of penetrations I would have expected against hard targets."
Trying to get close
Whatever their cover, the CIA's spies are unlikely to single-handedly penetrate terrorist or proliferation groups, officials said. Instead, the agency stalks informants around the edges of such quarry -- moderate Muslims troubled by the radical message at their mosques; mercenary shipping companies that might accept illicit nuclear components as cargo; chemists whose colleagues have suspicious contacts with extremist groups.
Agency officials declined to respond to questions about the front companies and the decision to close them.
"Cover is designed to protect the officers and operations that protect America," CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said. "The CIA does not, for that very compelling reason, publicly discuss cover in detail."
But senior CIA officials have publicly acknowledged that the agency has devoted considerable energy to creating new ways for its case officers -- the CIA's term for its overseas spies -- to operate under false identities.
"In terms of the collection of intelligence, there has been a great deal of emphasis for us to use nontraditional methods," CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said in November 2006 radio interview shortly after taking the helm at the agency. "For us that means nontraditional platforms -- what folks call 'out of embassy' platforms -- and we're progressing along those lines."
The vast majority of the CIA's spies traditionally have operated under what is known as official cover, meaning they pose as U.S. diplomats or employees of another government agency.
The approach has advantages, including diplomatic immunity, which means that an operative under official cover might get kicked out of a country if he or she is caught spying, but won't be imprisoned or executed.
Official cover is also cheaper and easier. Front companies can take a year or more to set up. They require renting office space, having staff to answer phones and paying for cars and other props. They also involve creating fictitious client lists and resumes that can withstand sustained scrutiny.
One of the CIA's commercial cover platforms was exposed in 2003 when undercover officer Valerie Plame was exposed in a newspaper by columnist Robert Novak. Public records quickly led to the unraveling of the company that served as her cover during overseas trips, a fictitious CIA firm called Brewster Jennings & Associates.
Official cover worked well for the duration of the Cold War, when holding a job at a U.S. Embassy enabled American spies to make contact with Soviet officials and other communist targets.
But many intelligence officials are convinced that embassy posts aren't useful against a new breed of adversaries. "Terrorists and weapons proliferators aren't going to be on the diplomatic cocktail circuit," said one government official familiar with the CIA's cover operations.
Under intense pressure
After the terrorist strikes, the Bush administration ordered the agency to expand its overseas operation by 50%. The agency came under intense pressure from Congress to alter its approach to designing cover and got a major boost in funding to expand the nonofficial cover program, which is commonly referred to by the acronym NOC, pronounced "knock."
Although the agency has used nonofficial cover throughout its history, the newer front companies were designed to operate on a different scale. Rather than setting up one- or two-person consulting firms, the plan called for the creation of companies that would employ six to nine case officers apiece, plus support staff.
The NOC program typically had functioned as an elite entity, made up of a small number of carefully selected case officers, some of whom would spend years in training and a decade or more overseas with only intermittent contact with headquarters. But the new plan called for the front companies to serve as way stations even for relatively inexperienced officers, who would be rotated in and out much the way they would in standard embassy assignments.
"The idea was that these were going to be almost like black stations," said a former CIA official involved in the plan to form the companies. "We were trying to build something that had a life span, that had durability."
In the process, the agency hoped to break a logjam in getting post-Sept. 11 recruits overseas. Thousands of applicants had rushed to join the CIA after the attacks, and many were sent to Afghanistan and Iraq. But outside of those war zones, open slots were scarce.
"The embassies were full," said a former CIA official involved in deployment decisions. "We were losing officers by the dozens because we didn't have slots for them overseas."
In separate interviews, two former CIA case officers who joined the agency after the attacks said that 15% to 20% of their classmates had quit within a few years. Among them, they said, was one who had earned his master's degree in business administration from Harvard University and was fluent in Chinese and another who had left a high-paying job at the investment firm Goldman Sachs.
The front companies were created between 2002 and 2004, officials said, and most were set up to look like consulting firms or other businesses designed to be deliberately bland enough to escape attention.
About half were set up in Europe, officials said -- in part to put the agency in better position to track radical Muslim groups there, but also because of the ease of travel and comfortable living conditions. That consideration vexed some CIA veterans.
"How do you let someone have a white-collar lifestyle and be part of the blue-collar terrorist infrastructure?" said one high-ranking official who was critical of the program.
But the plan was to use the companies solely as bases. Case officers were forbidden from conducting operations in the country where their company was located. Instead, they were expected to adopt second and sometimes third aliases before traveling to their targets. The companies, known as platforms, would then remain intact to serve as vessels for the next crop of case officers who would have different targets.
'A very bitter fight'
The concept triggered fierce debate within the agency, officials said.
"This was a very bitter fight," said a CIA official who was a proponent of the plan because it insulated the fictitious firms from the actual work of espionage.
"When you link the cover to the operation, the minute the operation starts getting dicey, you run across the screen of the local police, the local [intelligence service] or even the senior people in the mosque," the official said. "I saw this kill these platforms repeatedly. The CIA invests millions of dollars and then something goes wrong and it's gone."
But critics called the arrangement convoluted, and argued that whatever energy the agency was devoting to the creation of covers should be focused on platforms that could get U.S. spies close to their most important targets.
"How does a businessman contact a terrorist?" said a former CIA official involved in the decision to shut down the companies. "If you're out there selling widgets, why are you walking around a mosque in Hamburg?"
Rather than random businesses, these officials said, the agency should be creating student aid organizations that work with Muslim students, or financial firms that associate with Arab investors.
Besides broad concerns about the approach, officials said there were other problems with the companies. Some questioned where they were located. One, for example, was set up in Portugal even though its principal targets were in North Africa.
The issue became so divisive that the agency's then-director, Porter J. Goss, tapped the official then in charge of the CIA's European division, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, to lead an in-house review of the NOC strategy.
Mowatt-Larssen sided with critics of the approach and began pulling the plug on the companies before he left the agency to take a senior intelligence post at the Department of Energy, officials said. Mowatt-Larssen declined to comment.
The agency is in the midst of rolling out a series of new platforms that are more narrowly targeted, officials said. The External Operations and Cover Division has been placed under Eric Pound, a veteran foreign officer who was CIA station chief in Athens during the 2004 Olympics.
But the agency is still struggling to overcome obstacles, including resistance from many of the agency's station chiefs overseas, most of whom rose through the ranks under traditional cover assignments and regard the NOC program with suspicion and distrust.
In one recent case, officials said, the CIA's station chief in Saudi Arabia vetoed a plan to send a NOC officer who had spent years developing credentials in the nuclear field to an energy conference in Riyadh.
The NOC "had been invited to the conference, had seen a list of invitees and saw a target he had been trying to get to," said a former CIA official familiar with the matter. "The boss said, 'No, that's why we have case officers here.' "
14.01.2008
"Intellworld" publie un article sur la station de la CIA a Bagdad
Un article paru aujourd'hui sur "Intellworld" explore et analyse un domaine assez délicat , a savoir le travail de la CIA depuis sa station de Bagdad depuis l'année 2003. Court et concis, cet article restitue l'ambiance et a l'avantage de la clarté.
14.12.2007
Stephen Kappes
Parmi les maîtres espions "made in US", l'un de ceux qui retient incontestablement l'attention a eu l'honneur d'être nommé Directeur-adjoint de la CIA a la mi-2006, après une carrière tournée en priorité vers le Moyen-Orient au sein de l'Agence, ou il est entré en 1981. Il s'agit de Stephen Kappes.
Stephen Kappes
Stephen Kappes, est entré a la CIA en 1981,sans qu'on en sache plus. Il est fort possible qu'il ait été affecté a la Division Moyen-Orient / Asie du Sud (Alors dirigée par Charles Cogan) , Kappes y ayant fait l'essentiel de sa carrière.D'après une information, il a ét en poste durant sa carrière au Pakistan, donc soit entre 1981 et 1988, soit entre 1991 et 1995 (Donc a titre de Chef de station)
C'est en 1988 que sa biographie se précise: Kappes est nommé n° 2 de l'unité "Tefran" de la CIA (Equipe de la CIA basée a l'ambassade américaine a Francfort chargée de travailler contre l'Iran) ,chargée de la collecte de renseignements contre l'Iran et du débriefing des exilés. La CIA, après la perte de sa station a Téhéran (Prise d'otage de nombre de ses diplomates, dont le Chef de la station, Thomas Ahern) l'ambassade américaine a Téhéran en 1979 et plusieurs e) travaille donc contre l'Iran a partir de pays limitrophes, ou de pays ou la communauté iranienne est importante. C'est ainsi que l'unité "Tefran" a réussie a constituer un réseau au coeur de l'Iran. Pas pour longtemps: Le contre-espionnage iranien réussit a démanteler le réseau de la CIA durant 1988-1989, avec a la clé une trentaine d'interpellations. On peut aussi se demander (uniquement a titre d'hypothèse) si "Tefran" n'a pas joué un rôle dans l'enquête sur l'attentat de Lockerbie perpétré le 21.12.1988. Les informations obtenues indiquent très clairement que l'Iran était alors soupconnée d'avoir commandité cet attentat, hors le Vol 103 de la Pan Am a été la cible d'une bombe ressemblant fortement a celles utilisées par une cellule du FPLP-CG (Front Populaire de Libération de la Palestine-Commandement Général de Ahmed Jibril) lequel avait entre autres des contacts avec l'Iran..
Kappes est vers 1990 rappelé de Francfort et envoyé a l'Irak Task Force de la CIA (Alors dirigée par Whitley Bruner , et donc l'adjoint est Bruce Riedel) ,chargée de la collecte du renseignement ontre l'Irak suite a l'invasion du Koweït en août 1990. Kappes paraît, après seulement 10 ans de carrière a la CIA, avoir fait ses preuves, puisqu'il est nommé Chef de station a Koweït City quand le Koweït est libéré, avec pour mission de rouvrir la station. on peut donc supposer que il ne fut en poste que durant trois mois environ: Les officiers de la CIA chargés d'ouvrir une station ne restent sur place que trois mois puis sont remplacés par un officier qui, lui, la dirigera normalement, c'est-a-dire pendant 2 ou 3 ans..
Début 1995, il esr chef de l'unité chargée de la Prolifération nucléaire a la Division Eurasie Centrale de la Direction des Opérations de la CIA, avant d'être nommé en juillet 1995 "Senior Intelligence officer" de la CIA, sans qu'on en sache plus sur le poste qu'il occupe alors.
Il dirigera la station de Moscou de 1996 a 1999 (interlocuteur officiel auprès des services secrets russes) ou il remplace Michaël Sulick.Chef de la Division Moyen-Orient de 1999 a 2000,il est ensuite patron du Counterintelligence center de la CIA de 2000 a 2002, chargé d'empêcher les infiltrations des services secrets adverses (Avec une priorité pour les Chinois du MSS) au sein de la CIA .
Kappes est nommé n°2 de la Direction des Opérations de 2002 a 2004. A ce poste il réussira deux opérations dans la lutte contre la prolifération nucléaire. La première sera de convaincre le dirigeant libyen Mouamar Kadhafi d'abandonner son programme d'armes de destructions massives en échange d'une aide américaine. La deuxième est le démantèlement, au moins partiel, du réseau dirigé par le docteur A.Q.Khan. Ce scientifique pakistanais, père de la bombe atomique pakistanaise, a aidé entre autres la Corée du Nord ou l'Iran a se doter de composants pour développer une bombe atomique..
Ses succès de Kappes a la CIA n'empêchent pas son arrivée dans un contexte particulièrement difficile : Il est nommé patron de la Direction des Opérations en juin 2004, en remplacement de James Pavitt, qui vient de démissioner suite au scandale des Armes de destruction massives en Irak: Bien que Georges W.Bush affirme haut et fort que Saddam Hussein est en possession d'un dangereux arsenal d'armes chimiques, biologiques et nucléaires, il s'avérera après coup qu'il n'en est rien..La CIA ayant fourni certaines informations allant en ce sens s'en trouve décridibilisée , d'ou la démission de Pavitt, suivie par celle de Georges Tenet, le Directeur de la CIA et son remplacement par Porter Goss.Précédemment,c'est Alan Foley, Directeur du WINPAC ,chargé de l'analyse des informations relatives aux armements des autres pays ,et Tyler Drumhueller, patron de la Division Europe de l'Ouest de la Direction des Opérations de la CIA, qui ont claqués la porte.
Très vite, le ton monte entre Goss et Kappes. Une des raisons est la découverte après la réouverture en 2000 de l'ambassade américaine a Belgrade (Fermée suite a la Guerre du Kosovo) que certains documents secrets de la station de la CIA a Belgrade n'avaient pas été détruits durant l'évacuation..Kappes estimera que il n' y a pas eu divulgation des documents et s'opposera a toute sanction contre le chef de station, au contraire de Goss. Ce sera une des raisons du départ de Kappes en novembre 2004 , accompagné de Michaël Sulick, n°2 de la Direction des Opérations de la CIA.Il ne sera pas le seul a quitter Langley: Parmi les démissionaires on note Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, qui a remplacé Drumhueller a la tête de la Division Europe de l'Ouest; John R.Sano, ADDO ;Arthur Brown, qui a entre autres dirigé les stations de la CIA en Birmanie, en Corée du Sud et a Tokyo et qui est a la tête de la Division Asie; Robert Richer, chef de la Division Moyen-Orient de la Direction des Opérations (Auparavant chef de station a Oman et en Jordanie) part dans le domaine privé chez Blackwater.
Démissionant de la CIA en novembre 2004 suite au conflit avec le directeur de la CIA Porter Goss, il part pour Londres pour occuper un poste dans la firme de sécurité privée ArmorGroup International ,avant d'être rappelé a la CIA et nommé a la mi-2006 Directeur-adjoint de la CIA par le nouveau Directeur de la CIA Michaël Hayden, visiblement soucieux de mettre fin a l'ère Goss, qui n'apparaît pas avoir été appréciée a la CIA.. Kappes semble d'être surtout spécialisé sur le Moyen-Orient durant sa carrière, avec priorité pour l'Iran. Il se rendra d'ailleurs en février 2007 au Pakistan pour rencontrer des responsables de l'ISI, le service de renseignement pakistanais, et le général Musharraf en personne. But de la visite: Montrer aux autorités pakistanaises que Al-Qaîda se réactive sur le territoire pakistanais. Plus récémment, il aurait semblé convaincu, selon des sources de la CIA -a prendre avec prudence- par le récent NIE affirmant que l'Iran a cessé son programme nucléaire..
05.12.2007
Le rapport de la communauté américaine du renseignement sur les capacités nucléaires iraniennes, novembre 2007
Paru il y a 48 heures, ce NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) défraie déja la chronique. Préparé, comme le veut la tradition pour les NIE, de concert entre les 16 services de renseignements américains (Citons par exemple le Homeland Security, la Central Intelligence Agency, la National Security Agency, le Defense Intelligence Agency, ainsi que le service de renseignement du Ministère de l'Energie US ou le service de renseignements du Département d'Etat) et intitulé "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities" en date de novembre 2007, ce rapport indique entre autres que si l'Iran avait bien un programme nucléaire , il a été arrêté en 2003. A vos commentaires!
Key Judgments
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear work.
• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
previously.
B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge
with high confidence it has not yet done.
C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
it to restart the program.
• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible.
F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—
rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
restarted through at least mid-2007.
G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
1 For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design
and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we
do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
Key Differences Between the Key Judgments of This Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear
Program and the May 2005 Assessment
2005 IC Estimate
Assess with high confidence that Iran
currently is determined to develop nuclear
weapons despite its international
obligations and international pressure, but
we do not assess that Iran is immovable.
We have moderate confidence in projecting
when Iran is likely to make a nuclear
weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before
early-to-mid next decade.
Iran could produce enough fissile material
for a weapon by the end of this decade if it
were to make more rapid and successful
progress than we have seen to date.
2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge
with high confidence that the halt lasted at least
several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate
confidence that the halt to those activities
represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons
program.) Assess with moderate confidence
Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know
whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt
was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from
exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear
work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence
that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
option to develop nuclear weapons.
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate
confidence Iran probably would be technically
capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR
judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this
capability before 2013 because of foreseeable
technical and programmatic problems.)
We judge with moderate confidence that the
earliest possible date Iran would be technically
capable of producing enough highly enriched
uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
this is very unlikely.