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La communauté du renseignement - Page 8

  • Le rapport de la communauté américaine du renseignement sur les capacités nucléaires iraniennes, novembre 2007

    Paru il y a 48 heures, ce NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) défraie déja la chronique. Préparé, comme le veut la tradition pour les NIE, de concert entre les 16 services de renseignements américains (Citons par exemple le Homeland Security, la Central Intelligence Agency, la National Security Agency, le Defense Intelligence Agency, ainsi que le service de renseignement du Ministère de l'Energie US ou le service de renseignements du Département d'Etat) et intitulé "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities" en date de novembre 2007, ce rapport indique entre autres que si l'Iran avait bien un programme nucléaire , il a été arrêté en 2003. A vos commentaires!



    Key Judgments

    A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
    program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
    keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
    that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
    enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
    international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
    undeclared nuclear work.
    • We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
    working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
    • We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
    intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
    assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
    to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)
    • We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
    program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
    nuclear weapons.
    • We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
    have a nuclear weapon.
    • Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
    to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
    that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
    suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged

    B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
    some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
    has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
    from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
    for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
    need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge
    with high confidence it has not yet done.

    C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
    fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
    program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
    judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
    • We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
    technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
    is very unlikely.
    • We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
    producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
    (INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
    foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
    possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

    D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
    be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
    Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
    confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
    projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
    also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

    E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
    to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
    options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
    it to restart the program.
    • Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
    international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
    approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
    military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
    international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
    security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
    by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
    weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
    • We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
    the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
    within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
    key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
    effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
    only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
    plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
    is inherently reversible.

     F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—
    rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
    weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
    conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
    were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
    restarted through at least mid-2007.

    G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
    and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

    H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
    capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.


    1 For the purposes of this Estimate, by “nuclear weapons program” we mean Iran’s nuclear weapon design
    and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we
    do not mean Iran’s declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.


     Key Differences Between the Key Judgments of This Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear
    Program and the May 2005 Assessment

    2005 IC Estimate

     Assess with high confidence that Iran
    currently is determined to develop nuclear
    weapons despite its international
    obligations and international pressure, but
    we do not assess that Iran is immovable.


    We have moderate confidence in projecting
    when Iran is likely to make a nuclear
    weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before
    early-to-mid next decade.


    Iran could produce enough fissile material
    for a weapon by the end of this decade if it
    were to make more rapid and successful
    progress than we have seen to date.



    2007 National Intelligence Estimate


    Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003,
    Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge
    with high confidence that the halt lasted at least
    several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate
    confidence that the halt to those activities
    represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons
    program.) Assess with moderate confidence
    Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
    program as of mid-2007, but we do not know
    whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
    weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt
    was directed primarily in response to increasing
    international scrutiny and pressure resulting from
    exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear
    work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence
    that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the
    option to develop nuclear weapons.

    We judge with moderate confidence that the
    earliest possible date Iran would be technically
    capable of producing enough highly enriched
    uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
    this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate
    confidence Iran probably would be technically
    capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
    sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR
    judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this
    capability before 2013 because of foreseeable
    technical and programmatic problems.)


    We judge with moderate confidence that the
    earliest possible date Iran would be technically
    capable of producing enough highly enriched
    uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that
    this is very unlikely.

  • Rolf Mowatt-Larssen ,Рольф Моватт-Ларсен


     Rolf Mowatt-Larssen's career. 


    Фото здесь Photo is here 

    La biographie de Rolf Mowatt-Larssen est aussi disponible en francais ici 


    Карьера сотрудника ЦРУ Рольф Моватт-Ларсен


    Начал карьеру в ЦРУ, Оперативный Директорат в 1982ом году.

    Сотрудник резидентуры ЦРУ в Стокольме с 1984 по 1987.

    Сотрудник резидентуры ЦРУ в Москве с 1988 по 1990,Моватт-Ларсен официально работал в политическом отделе Посольства США в Москве.

    С 1990 по 1992 работал в резидентуре ЦРУ в Афинах но не удалось кстановить кем он был Руководитель резидентуры, заместитель или сотрудник.

    С 1992 по 1994 Заместитель резидента ЦРУ в Москве, Моватт-Ларсен отвечал за контакты с СВР (Служба внешней разведки ). Но когда руководителя резидентуры Джеймс Моррис был объявлен персоной нон грата после выдворений резидента СВР в Вашингтоне А.И. Лысенко, Моватт-Ларсен становиться резидентом ЦРУ . Hо не на долго. Он уже 2 года в Москве и слишком молод чтобы быть постоянным резидентом. Прибывает новый резидент, опытный сотрудник Майкл Сулик, официально советник по региональным вопросам посольства.

     В 1994 Моватт-Ларсена назначают руководителем Оперативной Базы ЦРУ в Цюрихе он занимает этот пост до 1996.

     Руководитель резидентуры ЦРУ в Осло с 1998 по 2000.

     Он работал с Д.Тенетом (Директор ЦРУ) а с середины 2001 начал учить китайский язык он должен был быть назначен Руководителем резидентуры ЦРУ в Пекине, но после терактов 11ого сентября он был назначен руководителем Управлений по борьбе с распространением ОМУ оружия массового уничтожения Оперативного Директората ЦРУ  а в 2004 он стал Руководителем Подразделений Западная Европа а в 2005 ушел из ЦРУ из за несогоачиях с Портер Госсом новый руководитель ЦРУ и был назначен Руководителем разведки и контрразведи Госдепартамента энергетики.

    Rolf Mowatt-Larssen's career


    Joined CIA in 1982.

    Case officer in Stockholm from 1984 to 1987.

    Case officer in CIA Station in Moscow from 1988 to 1990. Officially Mowatt-Larssen was member of the political section inside the US Embassy.

    Case officer (Or Deputy Station Chief, or Station Chief???) in Athens, from 1990 to 1992.

    Deputy Chief of Station in CIA Moscow Station from 1992 to 1994, officially first secretary of the political section of the US Embassy.He was in charge of officials contacts with SVR ( Russian foreign intelligence service).

    After, James L.Morris, CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, his boss, was expelled , Mowatt is promoted as Acting Chief of Station, but replaced by Michaël Sulick as head of CIA Station

    Chief of Base in Zurich from 1994 to 1996

    Chief of station in Oslo from 1998 to 2000. 

    He works with George Tenet (CIA Director) but  in mid-2001 he begins to learn Chinese, to be posted as CIA Station Chief in Beijing.But after the 9/11 events, Mowatt was named as  DO CPD CIA Director ( Counterproliferation Division of the CIA 's Directorate of Opérations).

     In 2004 , named as West European Division Chief. but he disagrees Goss's (The new CIA Director) politic about the Agency and resigns. Promoted as Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the US Department of Energy.



  • Un exemple de la lutte des services secrets contre la corruption

    Parmi les missions incombant aux services secrets on notera la lutte contre la criminalité organisée, qu'il s'agisse du terrorisme ou du blanchiment d'argent, du trafic de stupéfiants ou d'armes etc...

    En Russie, au sein du FSB (Contre-espionnage et sécurité intérieure de la Fédération de Russie) cette mission relève du Service antiterrorisme (2ème Service du FSB), depuis 2000 du Contre-espionnage militaire (Pour les infractions commises au sein des Forces armées) et aussi du 4ème Service du FSB , le contre-espionnage économique, dont l'appelation officielle est SEB ( Служба экономической безопасности ,Service de la sécurité économique). Le SEB est dirigé depuis 2004  par Alexandre Bortnikov.

    ed8d6021e1d7e61b125f2b5d410bd4a7.jpgAlexandre Bortnikov est depuis 2004 a la tête du Service de sécurité économique du FSB de la Fédération de Russie. Entré au KGB en 1975, il a travaillé comme n°2 de la Direction du FSB pour la Région de Saint-Pétersbourg avant d'en prendre la tête en juin 2003.Nommé le 24.02.2004 a la tête du 4ème Service du FSB. Général-lieutenant, il a eu entre autres a traiter l'affaire ici relatée.
    En plus de son travail en tant que patron du 4ème Service, Bortnikov est aussi: Depuis juin 2004 membre du groupe de travail interservices d'étude de la conception de la stratégie nationale dans la lutte contre le blanchiment de l'argent provenant d'activités criminelles; Depuis octobre 2004 Membre de la Commission gouvernementale sur les questions d'intégration économique; depuis 2004, membre du conseil des Directeurs de la société "Sovkomflot"; depuis avril 2005 membre de la commission du contrôle des exportations de la Fédéraion de Russie; depuis décembre 2005 membre de la commission gouvernementale pour les questions du complexe énérgétiques; a partir d'avril 2006 membre de la commission gouvernementale assurant l'intégration des entreprises de construction de la Fédération de Russie. 

    Est ici relatée une affaire de corruption traitée par le SEB fin 2005, et qui a connu un premier dénouement judiciaire en avril dernier, avec la condamnation d'un des principaux accusés a 10 ans de prison. 

    Tout commence en 2005 par une enquête de la 50ème inspection interdépartementale ( chargée du contrôle des banques)  du FNS ( Service Fédéral des Impôts russe), relative a plusieurs transactions sur les pierres précieuses effectuées entre plusieurs banques russes de 2001 a 2002, dont l'une d'elle est la banque de crédits russe "Rossiiskii Kapital" (Capital russe). Les services fiscaux suspectent ses transaction de cacher en réalité un schéma pour éviter de payer la TVA. Aussi le FNS exige a l'automne 2004 de "Rossiiskii Kapital" , pour non-paiement de la TVA, une somme de deux milliards de roubles a titre d'impôts non payés, soit le quart de l'actif de la banque.

    C'est alors que un jeune haut fonctionnaire du FNS, Oleg Alexeyev, au courant (Dans le cadre de ses activités au FNS) des problèmes rencontrés par la Banque décide de les "aider" et ,en compagnie de Alexey Mishin , de la Banque de Russie, rencontre en septembre 2005 Alexey Ivachenko, Président du Conseil des Directeurs de l"Rossiiskii Kapital" a qui il propose contre un pot-de-vin (appelés aussi "dessous de table" ou "commissions occultes") de 5.3 millions de dollars (Soit 10% de la somme exigée par les Services du FNS)  de "passer l'éponge" sur l'impayé de "Rossiiskii Kapital", en annulant cette dette. Alexeyev déclarera a Ivachenko que si elle ne paye pas, alors une enquête criminelle sera ouverte tandis que la banque même fera faillite. Ivachenko prévient immédiatement le Service de sécurité du FNS puis le FSB, qui décide de tendre un piège au corrupteur.  Le FSB commence aussitôt a utiliser son arcenal pour rassembler des preuves (Qui seront plus tard utilisées par le Tribunal) : Il est mis sur écoutes et surveillé.

    Le schéma proposé est le suivant: Oleg Alexeyev s'adresse a la Direction principale territoriale pour Moscou de la Banque de Russie, qui lui fournira un document officiel indiquant que les violations commises par l'établissement de crédit ne sont pas si graves. En échange "Rossiskii Kapital" payera a Alexeyev 1 million de dollars. Une deuxième partie, 2.5 millions de dollars, doit être remise a des fonctionnaires du FNS et de la Direction Principale Territoriale pour Moscou de la Banque de Russie. 

    44500bbd61423af82cbea73b98537c9e.jpg 7e58710a2649b1ef59534fd2282af7ad.jpg








    Interpellation de Oleg Alexeyev (Photos du FSB) 


      Le 17.10.2005 au soir, le Service de sécurité économique du FSB , en coopération avec le Service de sécurité du FNS interpelle Oleg Alexeyev, 28 ans, chef-adjoint de la Direction des organismes de crédits au FNS.  L'interpellation de Alexeyev a eu lieu juste en face du Kremlin, au restaurant de l'hôtel "Balchug Kempinski Moscou", juste après que un salarié de la Banque ait remis a Alexeyev une malette contenant 1 millions de dollars. C'est au moment ou Alexeyev a commencé a compter l'argent contenu dans la malette que se sont approchés de lui les officiers du FSB et du FNS

    94530cfcfa32ec0ef6b4402d09b973ed.jpgLes officiers du FSB emmenent Alexeyev

    A 4 heures du matin le 28.10.2005, les forces de l'ordre russes investissent un appartement, Chaussée Roublev a Moscou. Ils interpellent Alexey Mishin, 26 ans, haut fonctionnaire, du Service juridique de la Direction principale territoriale pour Moscou de la Banque de Russie, et complice de Alexeyev. La perquisition menée a son domicile n'a rien donnée.

    Le plus intéréssant, notent les responsables des services de sécurité, est la perquisition du bureau de Mishin a la Banque de Russie : Y sont découvertes trois valises remplies d'argent. Montant total: 968000 dollars et 45000 euros, sans que il soit possible de déterminer d'ou vient cet argent. Interrogé sur la provenance de cette somme, il a indiqué que cela n'a rien a voir avec cette affaire. Les enquêteurs n'excluent pas que ce n'est pas la première fois que le fonctionnaire se faisait remettre des pots-de-vin. Les enquêteurs découvriront aussi que Mishin a menti a ses patrons de la Banque de Russie en affirmant ne pas avoir d'appartement ( Alors qu'il avait celui Chaussée Roublev et une a Kountsévo ) et a donc recu un appartement de fonction sur la Perspective Lénine.

    Les deux fonctionnaires ont été inculpés sur la base de l'article 290 alinéa 4 du Code pénal de la Fédération de Russie selon l'officier instructeur en charge des affaires d'importance au Bureau du Procureur de Moscou Ilya Maloféev, et maintenus en détention pour éviter leur fuite.

    L'article 290 du Code Pénal de la Fédération de Russie, en son alinéa 1, indique que cet article concerne la corruption dont les auteurs sont des personnes occupant des fonctions officielles (Donc les représentants de l'Etat). Cette corruption peut prendre plusieurs formes: Recevoir de l'argent, un bien, des actions ou des avantages matériels . Et ce pour des activités en faveur de la personne qui donne le pot-de-vin ou des personnes qu'il représente , si de telles activités entrent dans le cadre du service de la personne occupant une fontion officielle. Selon l'alinéa 4 de l'article 290 du Code Pénal russe, les activités prévues a l'article 290-1 du Code Pénal sont punies de 7 a 12 ans de prison avec une amende pouvant aller jusqu'a 1 million de roubles dans les cas: Ou l'infraction a été commise par un groupe organisé ou planifié; utilisation de la force; que le pot-de-vin a été obtenu par extorsion ( Donc que le fonctionnaire a exigé le pot-de-vin) ; que la somme du pot-de-vin est importante.

    Toutefois, selon les déclarations de Ivachenko, Alexeyev a fait référence de payer aussi des pots-de-vins a de hauts responsables du Ministère des finances russe. Sans que on en sache plus. Ironie de l'histoire, le Ministre des Finances Alexei Kudrin avait déclaré 96 heures avant l'interpellation de Alexeyev qu'il faut non pas se battre pour baisser les impôts, mais contre les "impôts corrompus"... Le MinFin s'est refusé a tout commentaire a propos de cette affaire, et aucun fonctionnaire n'a été inculpé, faute de preuves. Alexeyev lui-même ne s'est guère montré coopératif au cours de l'instruction, niant les faits puis préntendant que il pensait que dans la malette il y avait des documents pour régler le conflit.. 

    e90293135244a9ae09fb09ecb06027a3.jpgAlexeyev et Mishin lors de leur jugement

    Jugés en première instance en avril 2007 par le Tribunal de Moscou ,Alexeyev et Mishin ont été condamnés a 10 ans de prison, 1million de dollars d'amende chacun. Le Tribunal a aussi accepté la plainte déposée par Alexey Ivachenko qui réclame a titre de dommages-intérêts $68000 (Le pourcentage de crédits pour le million de dollars qu'il a dû prendre a sa propre banque)

     Après tout me diront certains, ce n'est rien, une affaire parmi d'autres, la corruption n'est pas vaincue en Russie . D'autres soutiendront peut-être que cela ne sert a rien de lutter contre la corruption, que les pots-de-vins sont la règle.

    Concernant le premier point c'est a mes yeux une affaire symbolique, ( Etant donné le statut des personnes interpellées)  qui montre bien que il y a des tentatives,en Russie, pour se battre contre la corruption, y compris a très haut niveau. Cela a été confirmé la semaine dernière par l'interpellation d'un Vice-Ministre des Finances pour détournement de fonds. Le chemin pour eradiquer la corruption en Russie sera extrêmement long, mais les forces de l'ordre, bien que elles aussi touchées par ce phénomène, comptent elles aussi des personnes honnêtes.

    Concernant le second point, ma réponse est  catégorique, et c'est non. Que permet la corruption, sinon de fausser la concurrence ,puisqu'il suffira par exemple de donner une commission occulte pour obtenir un marché un un avantage ? Dans le cadre des marchés publics par exemple, les entreprises ne seraient plus séléctionnées selon leur compétence mais selon le montant du pot-de-vin... Que permettra la corruption, sinon de poursuivre le principe 'Tout s'achète", et que comme le note la commissaire des Renseignements généraux Brigitte Henri ( Ouvrage "Au coeur de la corruption. Par une commissaire des RG) la corruption entraîne le clientélisme, et le pillage, mais aussi ,quand elle touche comme ici des personnes dépositaires du service public , que elle entrave l'action de l'Etat car ses agents seront plus sensibles aux pots-de-vins que a l'accomplissement de leur mission? Alexeyev comptait, pour lui et une poignée de personnes, obtenir par des pots-de-vin des fonds d'une banque qui n'avait pas payée la TVA aux services fiscaux russes. La banque devait pour cela payer 5.3 millions de dollars a Alexeyev et ses amis ( Ou prétendus amis, on ne peut exclure qu'il aurait mené seul avec Mishin toute l'opération et aurait prétendu que il faut graisser la patte de nombre de personnes uniquement pour justifier l'obtention d'une somme aussi rondelette) soit 6% (Selon une source) ou 10% (selon une autre) de ce que devait la Banque au fisc. Je vous laisse calculer, si les criminels avaient réussis, combien ne serait pas rentré dans  le Budget étatique russe.




    FSB de la Fédération de Russie  http://www.fsb.ru

    FNS Service Fédéral des Impôts http://www.nalog.ru/

    Banque "Rossiiskii Kapital"        http://roscap.ru/ 



  • Les techniques du SIS britannique

    Appelé aussi SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), mais plus connu sous le nom de MI6, le service de renseignement extérieur britannique est un service a la réputation, aux opérations, succès et scandales plutôt discrets, mais qui n'en paraît pas moins être d'une grande efficacité. Deux hauts responsables des services secrets soviétiques et russes ( Rem Krassilnikov, chef du 2ème Département, chargé de lutter entre autres contre le renseignement britannique, du contre-espionnage du KGB de 1973 a 1979, et Evgueni Primakov, Chef du renseignement extérieur russe, le SVR, de 1992 a 1996) estiment que durant la Guerre Froide , et même après, ce fut un des services ennemis les plus redoutables et expérimentés. 

    MI6 a aussi pour lui l'avantage d'être un service plus petit et moins bureaucratique que les grands services de renseignement, comme semble le montrer la lecture du livre de Richard Tomlinson "PLus permis de tuer" .Un service plutôt efficace, adapté aux dangers du monde et réagissant assez vite. Un des exemples les plus célèbres est l'exfiltration, malgré la surveillance du KGB, de Oleg Gordievsky, un officier du KGB , par la station de Moscou a la mi-1985 ( Chef de station: Andrew Gibbs. Chef de station adjoint: Raymond Asquith)

    On remarquera que, bien plus petit que son homologue US, le SIS n'en est pas moins un service efficace. Une attention particulière est prêtée a la couverture des officiers traitants en poste dans les ambassades a l'étranger, beaucoup plus fiables que celles de leurs homologues de la CIA. Si on vera jamais un chef de station du SIS diriger la section information de l'ambassade ( Ils sont généralement 1er secrétaires ou conseillers) néanmoins leur identification est beaucoup plus difficile que pour les chefs de stations de la CIA. L'erreur de la CIA est d'utiliser, pour les couvertures de ses chefs de station, des titres assez fantaisistes. Par exemple, Fred Woodruff , chef de station a Tbilissi tué en 1993, était "regional affairs officer". Sauf que quand on demanda lors d'une conférence a un responsable du Département d'Etat ce que recouvraient les fonctions de cet "Officier aux affaires régionales", il ne sut quoi répondre... Le MI6 utilise au contraire des couvertures beaucoup plus solides, qui se rapprochent beaucoup plus de celles d'un authentique diplomate britannique. Mais ils n'en ont que le titre, ils n'en occupent pas la fonction. Pourquoi? Parce que MI6 depend du FCO ( Foreign and Commonwealth Office, le Ministere des affaires etrangeres britannique) donc les contacts sont plus frequents et la possibilite d obtenir des couvertures plus faciles. Au contraire, la CIA et la DGSE presentent le desavantage de ne pas etre apprecies des diplomates et de se voir par consequent attribuer des couvertures les rendant plus facilement identifiables...

    Un exemple avec le chef d'une station du MI6 au Moyen-Orient en 2005 (Bien que son nom ait été dévoilé par un journal britannique récemment , précisant que cette personne a quitté MI6 pour assurer un haut poste dans le domaine de la sécurité gouvernementale britannique, je préfère ne pas dévoiler son identité ni le pays ) dont la couverture était "conseiller politique de l'ambassade". Ayant obtenu son nom et le lieu ou il a été chef de station ,restait a déterminer sa couverture dans cette ambassade. L'examen de la liste diplomatique a permis d'établir que cette ambassade britannique comptait pas moins de quatre "conseillers politiques". Conclusion, l'un ( Qui avait été précédemment identifié comme chef de station) n'avait que cette appelation de  "facade", les trois autres , authentiques diplomates, occupant des fonctions réelles.

    Les stations du MI6 a l'étranger sont plus petites mais aussi , par conséquent, elles sont censées beaucoup moins "s'éparpiller" ,se centrer sur l'essentiel, bien connaître la situation locale. On est loin aussi de l'incursion forcée des politiques dans la détermination de ce que MI6 ne peut pas faire. C'est parce que on lui avait limitée , entre autres, sa marge de manoeuvre en Iran que la CIA n'a pas su prévoir la montée en puissance en 1979 des mouvements contestataires entraînant la chute du Shah et l'arrivée au pouvoir de Khomeiny. Donc un certain pragmatisme, tout en étant conscient de la nécéssité de défendre les positions britanniques, surtout que si il détermine parfois les priorités du renseignement britannique, le pouvoir politique paraît n'avoir que rarement commis l'erreur d'empêcher les activités de ses services ou de ne voulois que des renseignements allant dans le sens souhaité et non pas dans le sens inverse.

    Cela n'empêche pas des ratées. Au Moyen-Orient,  restent a l'esprit les tentatives d'assassinat ratées de Nasser en 1956, ou la mauvaise évaluation des capacités dans le domaine des armes de destruction massives de l'Irak. En revanche MI6 peut être dédouané pour deux "ratées" qu'on lui a , assez injustement, mis sur le dos. La première est la Guerre des Falklands, correctement prévue par MI6 , et entre autres par le chef de station MI6 de Buenos Aires, Mark Heathcote, tout comme l'approche de troupes irakiennes a la frontière avec le Koweït en 1990. L'information est recue, analysée, remonte vers le Joint Intelligence Commitee ( chargé de la coordination des services secrets de Sa Majesté) , lequel n'en tient pas compte.... Mais MI6 pouvait-il prévoir l'invasion de l'Irak sur le Koweït même? Pas sûr. Le point de vue de Claude Silberzhan, alors Directeur de la DGSE , est très intéréssant: Il note dans son ouvrage sur ses années a la DGSE que l'opération d'annexion du Koweït paraît avoir été littéralement improvisée, comme le montrent les mouvements des troupes irakiennes par exemple . La théorie de l'ancien patron de la DGSE est que si Saddam a bien massé des troupes a la frontière koweïtienne, le but était de faire peur au Koweït, pas de l'attaquer. mais c'est en apprenant que le Koweït a rejeté ses exigeances que il décida sur-le-champ d'attaquer. Pourquoi pas? 

     Les rares informations sur les méthodes de travail du MI6 sont disponibles dans les mémoires de Richard Tomlinson ainsi que dans le rapport de Lord Butler , qui s'est entre autres penché sur le travail des services secrets britanniques en direction de l'Irak.

    Le général Rem Krassilnikov ( Chef du 2ème département de la 2ème Direction Principale du KGB ,chargée entre autres de la lutte contre le MI6 sur le territoire soviétique), note lui-même le soin apporté par la station du MI6 a Moscou dans ses opérations sur le territoire soviétique. 

    Contrairement a la CIA, MI6 n'est pas un service a faire étalage de son travail sur la place publique. Les scandales sont rares , discrets, et on s'efforce de les étouffer dans l'oeuf.

     Sur les cadres du SIS , enfin. MI6 a pris l'habitude de recruter ses cadres chez l'élite, parmi les personnes sortant d'universités prestigieuses telles que Oxford ou Harvard.Des personnes cultivées, parlant parfois d'autres langues étrangères, qui représentent "la crème de la crème" britannique et sont donc moins susceptibles de "passer a l'ennemi" ( du moins en théorie, les universités britanniques ayant aussi été touchées dans les années 30 par l'attirance du modèle communiste. L'un d'eux , a la solde du renseignement extérieur soviétique, occupera de hauts postes au sein du SIS avant de passer en URSS en 1963. Il s'agit de Kim Philby.). Par exemple, prenons le diplômé de Oxford Terence O'Brian Tear .Entré au MI6, il y fut Chef de station a Moscou de 1952 a 1954 puis chef de station a Berne dans les années 70 ou son plus beau succès fut le recrutement de Vladimir Rezun, un officier du GRU). Ou plus récémment David Spedding, qui fit l'essentiel de sa carrière au sein de MI6 au Moyen-Orient (exception pour un bref séjour a la station de Santiago du Chili de 1972 a 1974, en plein coup d'Etat de Pinochet, puis a la tête de la Division irlandaise du MI6 de 1981 a 1983) après être sorti du Hertford College de Oxford. Toutefois, menace terroriste obligeant, MI6 a dû plus s'ouvrir sur le monde extérieur au niveau du recrutement de ses cadres. sont particulièrement prisées les personnes parlant russe, chinois, arabe, ou perse. MI6 a donc dû s'ouvrir aux minorités ethniques pour avoir en son sein des cadres parlant des langues assez rares.. La situation est si urgente que une annonce publique en ce sens a été passée a la BBC. Nul doute que le Service de James Bond saura s'adapter aux nouvelles menaces, en coopération avec les différents services secrets de Sa Majesté (MI5, GCHQ, DIS, SOCA ,SAS)


    Adresse Internet du SIS: http://www.sis.gov.uk/


  • Le blog n'est pas mort

    Petite pose cette semaine, étant un peu débordé , pour le blog, mais ne vous inquiétez pas il revient!

    Actuellement est en cours de traduction l'interview donnée par Nikolaï Patrushev ,le Directeur du FSB de la Fédération de Russie

    Notons aussi l'apparition d'un premier article consacré a la station de la CIA a Bagdad depuis la chute de Saddam Hussein qui est disponible 

    Va très bientôt être modifié l'article relatif a la station de la CIA a Beijing ainsi que celui sur la station de Paris, de nouvelles informations étant aparues.

    Enfin, l'album photos relatif aux "officiers des services secrets" a été légèrement remanié,  avec l'apparition de nouvelles têtes et la suppression d'autres


  • Interview de Nikolaï Patrushev, Directeur du FSB (En russe ).


    8e98f5128e3e7d74b3dabde640139b3f.jpg Interview donnée par Nikolaï Platonovitch Patrushev (photo) ,directeur du FSB , le service de sécurité intérieure et de contre-espionnage russe , au journal "Arguments et faits" ( Argumentii i fakti).


    Контрразведка: шпионов сегодня ловят так...Опубликована: 10.10.2007 16:56:30

    Сегодня Россия является объектом пристального внимания нескольких десятков иностранных разведывательных служб. За какими секретами охотятся иностранные шпионы и как работает российская контрразведка, главному редактору «АиФ» Николаю Зятькову рассказал директор ФСБ России генерал армии Николай Патрушев
    - Николай Платонович, с чем связана активизация в последние годы разведдеятельности иностранных спецслужб в отношении России?


    — Деятельность иностранных разведок в отношении нашего государства всегда была масштабна, а их активность не снижалась. При этом расходы ведущих иностранных держав на содержание спецслужб ежегодно увеличиваются на 15-20%. Прежде всего они интересуются сведениями о политической и социально-экономической обстановке в России, шагах руководства страны, направленных на укрепление государственности, территориальной целостности и экономики, отстаивание национальных интересов на международной арене, в том числе о реакции на развитие событий в странах СНГ. Особенно интересует зарубежные разведорганы состояние боеготовности, ход реорганизации российских Вооружённых сил, в первую очередь их ракетно-ядерной составляющей, развитие оборонно-промышленного комплекса, передовые образцы вооружений и военной техники, перспективные научные исследования, положение на Северном Кавказе и в регионах Дальнего Востока, Сибири, сырьевые ресурсы и инфраструктура их транспортировки.

    В настоящее время значительные усилия зарубежных спецслужб направлены на получение информации о ситуации, связанной с предстоящими выборами в Государственную думу и Президента Российской Федерации. Большой интерес с их стороны проявлен к расстановке политических сил, характеризующих данных кандидатов в депутаты и на пост главы страны, деятельности оппозиции. Кроме того, они пытаются в выгодном руководству своих государств русле оказывать влияние на протестные настроения и выступления в России.

    Помимо этого в ряде западных держав продолжают сохранять свои позиции политики, всё ещё мыслящие категориями времён «холодной войны». В духе школы Бжезинского ими прилагаются значительные усилия для того, чтобы воспрепятствовать России стать равноправным участником международных отношений, предъявляются претензии на наши территории и национальные богатства. Ставя распад СССР себе в заслугу, они теперь вынашивают планы, направленные на расчленение России. Специальные службы и организации ими рассматриваются в качестве достаточно эффективного инструмента их реализации.

    Грузия и Польша на службе ЦРУ

    - Спецслужбы каких государств особенно активны в этом плане?

    — Несмотря на известные всем глобальные изменения, произошедшие в конце 80-х — начале 90-х гг. прошлого века, спецслужбы государств — членов НАТО по-прежнему весьма активны в отношении России. Причём в этом ряду особо следует выделить Великобританию, спецорганы которой не только ведут разведку по всем направлениям, но и стараются повлиять на развитие внутриполитической ситуации в нашей стране.

    Отличаются своими действиями и турецкие спецслужбы, которые стремятся создавать и развивать позиции среди политической элиты и представителей крупного бизнеса в российских регионах компактного проживания мусульман. Пакистанская разведка стремится получить доступ к технологиям военного и двойного назначения, а также добыть сведения в отношении военно-технического сотрудничества России с рядом стран.

    ЦРУ и СИС (основные разведорганы США и Великобритании. — Ред.) продолжают привлекать к работе на российском направлении своих партнёров из Польши, Грузии, стран Балтии и некоторых других.

    - Удивляет, что против России активно действуют польские, прибалтийские и тем более грузинские спецслужбы.

    — А что здесь удивительного? Американские и британские спецслужбы оказывают серьёзное влияние на специальные органы как этих государств, так и некоторых других стран Восточной Европы. Это относится к самому широкому спектру: от формирования кадрового состава и распределения бюджета до выбора стратегических направлений деятельности и непосредственной организации совместных разведмероприятий.

    В угоду интересам «старших партнёров» и в соответствии с конъюнктурными соображениями политического руководства своих стран упомянутые разведки проводят операции, выходящие далеко за рамки их национальных интересов.

    Так, на территории указанных стран развёрнута работа, целью которой является вербовка российских граждан, проводятся операции по связи с агентурой. При этом некоторые из американских и английских союзников действуют весьма агрессивно. Кроме того, отдельные сотрудники спецслужб Грузии не брезгуют поддерживать связи с криминалитетом и всё чаще использовать его в разведывательных акциях и различных провокациях.

    - В последнее время в различных источниках часто появляется информация о провалах британской разведки…

    — Противодействуя британской разведке, мы всегда учитывали её многовековые традиции и огромный опыт в агентурной работе. Нам известны как её сильные стороны, так и слабые. Со времён королевы Елизаветы I сотрудники СИС руководствуются принципом «Цель оправдывает средства». Деньги, подкуп, шантаж, освобождение от наказания за совершённые преступления — их основные методы вербовки.

    Разоблачённые нашей контрразведкой в разное время агенты занимали достаточно высокое должностное положение. Это бывшие ответственные сотрудники военной разведки Скрипаль, МИДа — Обухов, внешней разведки — Гордиевский и Оямяэ.

    Вместе с тем в последнее время для достижения определённых политических целей англичане сделали ставку на лиц, обвиняемых в совершении уголовных преступлений и скрывающихся за рубежом от российского правосудия. Читатели, несомненно, помнят публикации в различных СМИ на тему обращения в органы безопасности российского гражданина Вячеслава Жарко с заявлением о его вербовке сотрудниками СИС при активном участии Березовского и Литвиненко.

    Всё это не могло не сказаться на качестве работы британской разведки — отсюда и провалы.

    Среди шпионов — военные и учёные

    - Какие подразделения ФСБ России занимаются непосредственно контрразведкой?

    — Главные задачи по противодействию спецслужбам иностранных государств возложены на Службу контрразведки, название которой говорит само за себя. Помимо этого она участвует в оперативном прикрытии государственной границы, совместно с другими подразделениями ФСБ России обеспечивает безопасность представительств иностранных государств на территории нашей страны, а также российских учреждений и граждан за рубежом во взаимодействии с заинтересованными ведомствами.

    Значительная роль в защите сведений, составляющих государственную тайну, и борьбе с научно-техническим и экономическим шпионажем принадлежит Службе экономической безопасности. Обеспечением безопасности в Вооружённых силах, в том числе и противодействием иностранным разведкам, занимается Департамент военной контрразведки. Противодействием вниманию зарубежных спецслужб к самим органам безопасности занимается Управление собственной безопасности.

    Под руководством этих подразделений организуют свою деятельность территориальные органы безопасности, органы безопасности в войсках и иных воинских формированиях, оперативно-технические и научно-технические структуры. В целом можно сказать, что в контрразведывательной деятельности участвуют в той или иной степени все наши подразделения.

    - И каковы результаты их работы?

    — За период с 2003 года выявлено более 270 активно действовавших кадровых сотрудников и 70 агентов иностранных разведок, в числе которых 35 российских граждан. Предупреждены преступные действия ещё 6 граждан нашей страны, намеревавшихся инициативно передать зарубежным спецслужбам сведения, составляющие государственную тайну.

    В качестве примеров можно привести разоблачение и осуждение на длительные сроки лишения свободы упомянутых Оямяэ, Скрипаля, Обухова, а также Сыпачёва, Думенкова, Смаля, Белошапкина, Запорожского и других.

    Только в текущем году пресечена деятельность 14 кадровых сотрудников и 33 агентов спецслужб иностранных государств. В частности, судом признан виновным в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст. 275 Уголовного кодекса (государственная измена), бывший военнослужащий Шабатуров, который с 1999 года сотрудничал с разведслужбой одного из западноевропейских государств и выдал ей сведения о ряде сотрудников российской военной разведки. Совсем недавно, 12 сентября, по этой же статье осуждён бывший сотрудник одного из НИИ Минобороны России Арсентьев, передавший иностранной спецслужбе сведения, составляющие государственную тайну. Сейчас в суде рассматривается уголовное дело ещё на одного человека, а в отношении троих ведётся следствие.

    Камень с электронной начинкой

    - Какие новинки шпионской техники используют иностранные разведки?

    — Разведки стремятся обеспечить своих агентов созданной на основе новейших достижений науки специальной техникой, которая позволяла бы им действовать тайно.

    Например, одним из самых уязвимых мест в деятельности спецслужб являются операции по связи, поэтому их техническому обеспечению уделяется самое пристальное внимание.

    В частности, такие технические средства использовались сотрудниками резидентуры СИС, действовавшими под прикрытием дипломатических должностей посольства Великобритании в России и разоблачёнными в декабре 2005 года.

    К техническим новинкам спецслужб Великобритании можно отнести и специальное устройство, замаскированное под аккумуляторную батарею портативного компьютера, работающее на тех же частотах, что и большинство мобильных телефонов. Им англичане снабдили одного из своих агентов. Сотрудник резидентуры, находясь на удалении и не вступая непосредственно в контакт с агентом, мог считывать с «аккумулятора» информацию и передавать собственную. Кроме того, российскому гражданину была передана программа, которая позволяла ему работать на компьютере, не оставляя никаких следов на жёстком диске.

    Также зарубежные разведорганы всё чаще пытаются использовать, в частности, возможности Интернета.

    - В последние годы мы часто слышим о том, что иностранные разведки используют в своей работе неправительственные организации…

    — Действительно, в арсенале иностранных спецслужб есть практика использования неправительственных организаций (НПО) как для добывания разведывательной информации, так и в качестве инструмента оказания скрытого влияния на политические процессы. Примеры тому можно найти, анализируя события, происходившие во время так называемых «цветных революций» на Украине, в бывшей Югославии, в Грузии и некоторых других странах. Немалую роль в них сыграли молодёжные организации, члены которых были подготовлены на зарубежные средства.

    Существует также угроза финансирования через возможности отдельных иностранных НПО фактически подрывной деятельности против России. Она зачастую исходит от международных террористических организаций, которые используют отдельные НПО в собственных интересах, в частности для финансовой поддержки бандформирований на Северном Кавказе. Всё это мы учитываем при организации нашей контрразведывательной деятельности.

    Внимательно изучаем и зарубежный опыт. Так, в Соединённых Штатах Америки разработан новый порядок выделения Агентством США по международному развитию грантов неправительственным организациям, который предусматривает ужесточение контроля за их деятельностью, в том числе со стороны спецслужб. Это позволит американским компетентным органам предотвращать использование выделяемых НПО средств в ущерб национальной безопасности своей страны.

    - Как изменилась ситуация в условиях действия нового российского закона о неправительственных организациях?

    — Изменения, внесённые в нормативный правовой акт, касаются общегосударственных мер по упорядочению деятельности НПО. Они не затрагивают прав ФСБ России — у нас не добавилось ни функций, ни полномочий.

    Хотел бы особо отметить, что мы понимаем важную роль неправительственных организаций в развитии и укреплении гражданского общества в нашей стране и заинтересованы в их деятельности. Внимание же контрразведки привлекают те НПО или их сотрудники, которые занимаются противоправной деятельностью, относящейся к нашей компетенции. Например, это могут быть попытки получить неправомочный доступ к сведениям, составляющим государственную тайну, или совершение иных действий, угрожающих безопасности России. Естественно, что такая деятельность очень далека от официально заявляемых целей.

    Общий враг России, США и Англии

    - Вы неоднократно подчёркивали важность международного сотрудничества спецслужб в условиях возрастания террористических угроз. Как это можно соотнести с работой контрразведки?

    — Несмотря на остроту противоборства с иностранными разведками, мы хорошо понимаем, что есть сферы, где спецслужбам необходимо взаимодействовать, в первую очередь это борьба с международным терроризмом.

    По нашему мнению, нам удалось сформировать достаточно действенную систему международного сотрудничества. На сегодняшний день сохраняется устойчивая тенденция к расширению его масштабов. Наша служба поддерживает активные контакты со 136 органами безопасности и спецслужбами 76 стран.

    Наиболее тесные отношения у нас сложились с коллегами из стран — участниц СНГ в рамках Совета руководителей органов безопасности этих государств (СРОБ). В последние годы к его работе проявляют всё больший интерес наши партнёры из дальнего зарубежья. Так, на заседания совета приглашаются в качестве наблюдателей представители спецслужб Италии, Франции, Германии и Испании. Кроме того, используются механизмы взаимодействия по линии рабочих органов «восьмёрки», институтов ООН, ЕС и ОБСЕ, ШОС и других международных или региональных организаций. Расширяется и сотрудничество в пограничной сфере — повышается эффективность работы Пограничного комитета Союзного государства России и Белоруссии, Совета командующих Пограничными войсками стран СНГ, Совета по пограничным вопросам государств — членов ЕврАзЭС и ряда других структур.

    Развитию партнёрских отношений служат ежегодно организуемые ФСБ России мероприятия более широкого формата — международные совещания руководителей спецслужб, органов безопасности и правоохранительных органов. В работе шестого совещания, которое прошло 6-7 сентября в Хабаровске, участвовали представители 53 стран и 4 международных организаций. В ходе этой встречи состоялся конструктивный и весьма полезный обмен мнениями по наиболее актуальным проблемам борьбы с терроризмом.

  • Le livre vert de l'IRA

    Le "livre vert" est un manuel de l'IRA, Irish Republican Army, sur la conduite que doivent adopter les membres de l'organisation dans le cadre de leurs activités.



    Irish Republican Army
    The Green Book I
    Commitment to the Republican Movement is the firm belief that its struggle both military and political is morally justified, that war is morally justified and that the Army is the direct representative of the 1918 Dail Eireann Parliament, and that as such they are the legal and lawful government of the Irish Republic, which has the moral right to pass laws for, and to claim jurisdiction over the territory, air space, mineral resources, means of production, distribution and exchange and all of its people regardless of creed or loyalty.
    The most important thing is security. That means you:
    YOU DON`T TELL YOUR FAMILY, FRIENDS, GIRLFRIENDS OR WORKMATES THAT YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE I.R.A. DON`T EXPRESS VIEWS ABOUT MILITARY MATTERS, IN OTHER WORDS YOU SAY NOTHING to any person. Don’t be seen in public marches, demonstrations or protests. Don’t be seen in the company of known Republicans, don’t frequent known Republican houses. Your prime duty is to remain unknown to the enemy forces and the public at large.
    Another important thing volunteers must realise and understand is the danger in drinking alcohol and the very real danger of over-drinking. Quite a large body of information has been gathered in the past by enemy forces and their touts from volunteers who drank.Volunteers are warned that drink-induced loose talk is the MOST POTENTIAL DANGER facing any organisation, and in a military organisation it is SUICIDE.
    [The recruit learns from Day One that:]
    The Irish Republican Army, as the legal representatives of the Irish people, are morally justified in carrying out a campaign of resistance against foreign occupation forces and domestic collaborators. All volunteers are and must feel morally justified in carrying out the dictates of the legal government; they as the Army are the legal and lawful Army of the Irish Republic which has been forced underground by overwhelming forces.
    The Army as an organisation claims and expects your total allegiance without reservation. It enters into every aspect of your life. It invades the privacy of your home life, it fragments your family and friends, in other words claims your total allegiance.All potential volunteers must realise that the threat of capture and of long jail sentences are a very real danger and a shadow which hangs over every volunteer. Many in the past have joined the Army out of romantic notions, or sheer adventure, but when captured and jailed they had after-thoughts about their allegiance to the Army. They realised at too late a stage that they had no real interest in being volunteers. This causes splits and dissension inside prisons and divided families and neighbours outside. Another important aspect all potential volunteers should think about is their ability to obey orders from a superior officer. All volunteers must obey orders issued to them by a superior officer whether they like the particular officer or not.
    Before any potential volunteer decides to join the Irish Republican Army he should understand fully and clearly the issues involved. He should not join the Army because of emotionalism, sensationalism, or adventurism. He should examine fully his own motives, knowing the dangers involved and knowing that he will find no romance within the Movement. Again he should examine his political motives bearing in mind that the Army are intent on creating a Socialist Republic.
    Volunteers are expected to wage a military war of liberation against a numerically superior force. This involves the use of arms and explosives. Firstly the use of arms. When volunteers are trained in the use of arms they must fully understand that guns are dangerous, and their main purpose is to take human life, in other words to kill people, and volunteers are trained to kill people. It is not an easy thing to take up a gun and go out to kill some person without strong convictions or justification. The Army, its motivating force, is based upon strong convictions which bonds the Army into one force and before any potential volunteer decides to join the Army he must have these strong convictions. Convictions which are strong enough to give him confidence to kill someone without hesitation and without regret. Again all people wishing to join the Army must fully realise that when life is being taken, that very well could mean their own. If you go out to shoot soldiers or police you must fully realise that they too can shoot you.Life in an underground army is extremely harsh and hard, cruel and disillusioning at times. So before any person decides to join the Army he should think seriously about the whole thing.
    The nationhood of all Ireland has been an accepted fact for more than 1,000 years and has been recognised internationally as a fact. Professor Edmund Curtis, writing of Ireland in 800 AD says that ‘she was the first nation North of the Alps to produce a whole body of literature in her own speech’, and he is told how the Danes were driven out or assimilated by a people ‘whose civilisation was a shining light throughout Europe’, prior to the Norman invasion of 1169 with which there ‘commenced more than 8 centuries of RELENTLESS AND UNREMITTING WARFARE that has lasted down to this very day’.
    The objective of the 800 years of oppression ‘is economic exploitation with the unjustly partitioned 6 counties remaining Britain’s directly controlled old-style colony’ and the South under the ‘continuing social, cultural, and economic domination of London’. This last led to Irish savings being invested in England ‘for a higher interest rate’ and many hundreds of thousands of boys and girls from this country had to emigrate to England to seek the employment which those exported savings created.
    Another aspect of economic imperialism at work is the export of raw, unprocessed materials: live cattle on the hoof, mineral wealth, fish caught by foreign trawlers etc. Further, from 1958 on, the Free State abandoned all attempts to secure an independent economy, and brought in foreign multi-national companies to create jobs instead of buying their skills and then sending them home gradually.
    ‘Africanisation’ is the word for this process elsewhere. Control of our affairs in all of Ireland lies more than ever since 1921 outside the hands of the Irish people.
    The logical outcome of all this was the full immersion in the E.E.C. in the 1970’s. The Republican Movement opposed this North and South in 1972 and 1975 and continues to do so. It is against such political economic power blocks East and West and military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It stands with our Celtic brothers and the other subject nations of Europe, and with the neutral and non-aligned peoples of the Third World; it seeks a third, socialist alternative which transcends both Western individualistic capitalism and Eastern state capitalism, which is in accordance with our best revolutionary traditions as a people.
    The position of the Irish Republican Army since its foundation in 1916 has been one of sustained resistance and implacable hostility to the forces of imperialism, always keeping in the forefront of the most advanced revolutionary thinking and the latest guerrilla warfare techniques in the world.
    The milestones, the battle honours won, the bloodstained trail of sacrifice, imprisonment, hunger strikes, executions, yet with telling blows delivered to the enemy, often in the heart of British imperialism itself, commanding the open admiration of freedom-loving peoples around the world.
    Note: The moral position of the Irish Republican Army, its right to engage in warfare, is based on:
    a) The right to resist foreign aggression
    b) The right to revolt against tyranny and oppression
    c) The direct lineal succession with the Provisional Government of 1916, the first Dail of 1919 and the second Dail of 1921.
    In 1938 the seven surviving faithful Republican Deputies delegated executive powers to the Army Council of the I.R.A. as per the 1921 resolution. In 1969 the sole surviving Deputy, Joseph Clarke, reaffirmed publicly that the then Provisional Army Council and its successors were the inheritors of the first and second Dail as a Provisional Government.
    Economic imperialism is evident on every main road and city street of Ireland: in Banking, Insurance, Merchant Marine, the Motor Industry, Mining, Fisheries, Industry in general, I.C.I., cultural imperialism epitomised in the Conor Cruise O’Briens of this Island, has been reinforced since the Treaty sell-out by successive Free State Governments via mass media, R.T.E., and the press and through education.
    The injustice of being as an individual politically impotent, the injustice of unemployment, poverty, poor housing, inadequate social security, the injustice of the exploitation of our labour, our intelligence and our natural resources, the injustice of the bloody-minded destruction of our culture, our language, music, art, drama, customs, the inherent injustice of the state repression which is necessary to maintain the present system as a whole.
    [So long as partition lasts a unified national concentration on correcting these injustices is not possible. ‘We must therefore first of all break the British connection’. The I.R.A. promises a democratic and socialist state]:
    A Government system which will give every individual the opportunity to partake in the decisions which will affect him or her: by decentralising political power to the smallest social unit practicable where we would all have the opportunity to wield political power both individually and collectively in the interests of ourselves and the nation as a whole. Socially and Economically we will enact a policy aimed at eradicating the Social Imperialism of today, by returning the ownership of the wealth of Ireland to the people of Ireland through a system of co-operativism, worker ownership, and control of the industry, Agriculture and the Fisheries.
    Culturally we would hope to restore Gaelic, not from the motivation of national chauvinism but from the viewpoint of achieving with the aid of a cultural revival the distinctive new Irish Socialist State: as a Bulwark against imperialist encroachments from whatever quarter. Internationally our alignment would hopefully be with the progressive Governments or former colonies like ourselves with the dual purpose of mutual advantage and of curbing the endeavours of imperialistic military and economic power blocs throughout the world.
    A new recruit’s immediate obstacle is the removal of his (her) ignorance about how to handle weapons, military tactics, security, interrogations etc. An O.C.’s might be how to put a unit on a military footing; an I.O.’s how to create an effective intelligence network; a Cumann Chairman’s how best to mount a campaign on a given issue, e.g. H Blocks etc., and for all members of the movement regardless of which branch we belong to, to enhance our commitment to and participation in the struggle through gaining as comprehensive an understanding as possible of our present society and the proposed Republican alternative through self and group education.
    Before we go on the offensive politically or militarily we take the greatest defensive precautions possible to ensure success, e.g. we do not advocate a United Ireland without being able to justify our right to such a state as opposed to partition; we do not employ revolutionary violence as our means without being able to illustrate that we have no recourse to any other means. Or in more everyday simple terms: we do not claim that we are going to escalate the war if we cannot do just that; we do not mount an operation without first having ensured that we have taken the necessary defensive precautions of accurate intelligence, security, that weapons are in proper working order with proper ammunition and that the volunteers involved know how to handle interrogations in the event of their capture etc., and of course that the operation itself enhances rather than alienates our supporters.
    Even the given situations of adequate bomb warnings are exploited which is again our mistake in not having sufficiently considered our defensive before going on the offensive: the so-called Bloody Friday being the prime example. Either we did not stop to consider that the enemy would ‘Dirty Joe’ us on the warnings or we overestimated the Brits’ ability to handle so many operations. But regardless of which is the case we made the mistake and the enemy exploited it.
    Other more everyday examples: the enemy exploits the mistake of a volunteer who stays in his own home by arresting him; he exploits the careless dumping of war materials by lifting them or, as is the most recent tactic, by assassinating volunteers who return to pick the materials up; he exploits I.R.A.-sticky [Official IRA] confrontations by staying out of the way to allow the subsequent detrimental publicity and effect on support to run its course; he exploits I.R.A.- Loyalist confrontations by moving in behind the I.R.A. unit and attacking it, plus again the detrimental international publicity.
    We exploit the enemy’s mistakes by propagating the facts. So it was with their murderous mistakes of the Falls Road curfew, Bloody Sunday and internment, which were exploited to our advantage support-wise as was the murder of John Boyle in Dunloy.
    Tactics are dictated by the existing conditions. Here again the logic is quite simple. Without support Volunteers, Dumps, Weapons, Finance, etc., we cannot mount an operation, much less a campaign. In September 1969 the existing conditions dictated that the Brits were not to be shot, but after the Falls curfew all Brits were to the people acceptable targets. The existing conditions had been changed.
    Likewise at present, for example, although the leadership of the S.D.L.P. has proved itself to be collaborationist and thus an enemy of the people, at various stages since 1974 we could have employed the tactic of making them subjects of ridicule by tarring and feathering them when for instance they were members of an Executive which tortured and interned Irishmen, which penalised rent and rates strikers etc., or when they recently declared at Westminster in a debate on H Block that ‘ Life should mean Life and there should be no Political Status’. The defensive precaution in the latter example being of course that the people be made aware beforehand that they actually did make such an utterance.
    The rule of thumb for all our actions can therefore be clearly seen to be that we must explain by whatever means we have at our disposal why we bomb, why we punish criminals, why we execute informers etc.
    We do not exclude taking an action which does not completely fill the criteria of this analysis on how to conduct the struggle. Many instances have arisen and will arise again when we have had to step outside these general terms of reference to our immediate detriment propaganda-wise and support-wise. However even in such an eventuality, if we rationalise our action, get our defensive before our offensive, try to ensure that we have an alternative, relatively unaffected area of support from which to operate if the support in the area which the detrimental but unavoidable action takes place, we are adhering as best as possible under the circumstances to a proper conduct of the war.
    The enemy, generally speaking, are all those opposed to our short-term or long-term objectives. But having said that, we must realise that all our enemies are not the same and therefore there is no common cure for their enmity. The conclusion then is that we must categorise and then suggest cures for each category.Some examples: We have enemies through ignorance, through our own fault or default and of course the main enemy is the establishment.
    The enemy through ignorance we attempt to cure through education though such an attempt is obviously futile if we do not firstly educate ourselves. Our means are marches, demonstrations, wall slogans, press statements, Republican press and publications and of course person-to-person communication. But as has already been stated, we must first educate ourselves, we must organise the protests and demonstrations efficiently, we must be prepared to paint the wall slogans and to sell and contribute to Republican press, Publications and Press statements.
    The enemy through our own fault or default is the one we create ourselves through our personal conduct and through our collective conduct of the struggle: the wee woman whose gate or back door gets pulled off its hinges by a volunteer evading arrest and who doesn’t get an apology as soon as possible afterwards or more preferably has the damage repaired by one of our supporters; the family and neighbours of a criminal or informer who has been punished without their being informed why. In brief our personal conduct as well as our conduct of our Republican activities must be aimed at if not enhancing support, at least not creating enemies unnecessarily.
    The establishment is all those who have a vested interest in maintaining the present status quo in politicians, media, judiciary, certain business elements and the Brit war machine compromising the Brit Army, U.D.R., R.U.C. ( r ) [reserve], Screws, Civilian Searchers. The cure for these armed branches of the establishment is well known and documented. But with the possible exceptions of the Brit Ministers in the ‘Northern Ireland Office’ and certain members of the judiciary, the overtly unarmed branches of the establishment are not so clearly identifiable to the people as our enemies as say armed Brits or R.U.C.
    It is our task therefore to clearly identify them to the people as such and again depending on the existing conditions and our ability to get our defensive before our defensive, effect a cure. Execution, as earlier stated is not the only way of making this category of establishment enemy ineffective: we can variously expose them as liars, hypocrites, collaborators, make them subjects of ridicule etc., e.g. The ‘Mason-Superthug’ poster image, the ‘Captain Nervewreck’ cartoon strip, the Conor ‘Booze’ O’Brien pun etc.
    Many figures of speech have been used to describe Guerrilla Warfare, one of the most apt being ‘The War of the Flea’ which conjured up the image of a flea harrying a creature of by comparison elephantine size into fleeing (forgive the pun). Thus it is with a Guerrilla Army such as the I.R.A. which employs hit and run tactics against the Brits while at the same time striking at the soft economic underbelly of the enemy, not with the hope of physically driving them into the sea but nevertheless expecting to effect their withdrawal by an effective campaign of continuing harassment contained in a fivefold guerrilla strategy.
    The strategy is:
    1. A War of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal.
    2. A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy’s financial interest in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing long term financial investment in our country.
    3. To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past several years ungovernable except by colonial military rule.
    4. To sustain the war and gain support for its end by National and International propaganda and publicity campaigns.
    5. By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and informers.
    While one of our chief considerations in deciding tactics is the concern for our friends, relatives, neighbours, our people in the midst of whom we operate, the enemy is simply dealing with an impersonal, inferior foreigner, a ‘Paddy’, ‘Musck-Savage’ or ‘Bog-Wog’, and with the great added advantage of all the resources and back up of a conventional army, para-military police, etc., e.g. M.R.F., S.A.S., plain clothes units, covert surveillance teams etc. At this juncture the most obvious differences between the Brits and the I.R.A. volunteer, apart from the fact that the Brit is an uninvited armed foreigner who has no moral or historical justification for being here in the first place, are those of support, motivation and freedom of personal initiative. The Brits support, his billets, dumps, weapons, wages, etc., are all as stated earlier provided for by involuntary taxation. His people who pay the taxes have never indicated nor indeed have they been asked to indicate by any democratic means their assent to his being here at their expense. The I.R.A. volunteer receives all his support voluntarily from his people.
    A member of the I.R.A. is such by his own choice, his convictions being the only factor which compels him to volunteer, his objectives the political freedom and social and economic justice for his people. Apart from the few minutes in the career of the average Brit that he comes under attack, the Brit has no freedom or personal initiative. He is told when to sleep, where to sleep, when to get up, where to spend his free time, etc.
    The I.R.A. volunteer, except when carrying out a specific army task, acts most of the time on his own initiative and must therefore shoulder that responsibility in such a way that he enhances our necessary stated task of ensuring that his conduct is not a contributory factor to the Brit attempt to isolate us from our people.
    By now it is clear that our task is not only to kill as many enemy personnel as possible but of equal importance to create support which will carry us not only through a war of liberation which could last another decade but which will support us pas t the ‘Brits Out’ stage to the ultimate aim of a Democratic Socialist Republic.
    Resistance must be channelled into active and passive support with an on-going process through our actions, our education programmes, our policies, of attempting to turn the passive supporter into a dump holder, a member of the movement, a paper seller etc., with the purpose of building protective support barriers between the enemy and ourselves, thus curbing the enemy’s attempted isolation policy. And of course the more barriers there are, the harder it is for the enemy to get at us while at the same time we increase the potential for active support in its various forms.
    The immediate protective barriers are of course, our own security, the other branches of the movement, our billets, etc. But we must build up other barriers by championing the various causes in our support areas through involvement in the various enemy structures which have been brought down as a result of the war: Policing, Transport, Bin-Collection, Advice-Centres, etc. The alternative to our plotting such a course is obvious. IF, for example, we have an area with a unit of I.R.A. volunteers and nothing else: No Sinn Fein Cumann, no Green Cross committee, no local involvement, etc., after a period, regardless of how successfully they have been against the Brits, they end up in jail leaving no structures behind: no potential for resistance, recruits, education or general enhancing of support.
    [It will be seen from the foregoing that despite all the political and military training and advice, the recruit must be warned that jail is something he will almost inevitably experience. Interrogations are frequently simulated in training to increase the volunteers’ awareness of what confronts them, which brings us to Green Book II]

    Irish Republican Army
    The Green Book II
    Volunteers Oath
    "I do solemnly promise to uphold and have belief in the objectives of the IRA and obey all orders issued to me by the Army Council and all my superior officers"
    Most volunteers are arrested on or as a result of a military operation. This causes an initial shock resulting in tension and anxiety. All volunteers feel that they have failed, resulting in a deep sense of disappointment. The police are aware of this feeling of disappointment and act upon this weakness by insults such as “you did not do very well: you are only an amateur: you are only second-class or worse”. While being arrested the police use heavy-handed `shock` tactics in order to frighten the prisoner and break down his resistance. The prisoner is usually dragged along the road to the waiting police wagon, flung into it, followed by the arresting personnel, e.g., police or Army. On the journey to the detention centre the prisoner is kicked, punched and the insults start. On arrival he is dragged from the police wagon through a gauntlet of kicks, punches and insults and flung into a cell.
    What A Volunteer Should Do When Arrested
    1. The most important thing to bear in mind when arrested is that you are a volunteer of a revolutionary Army, that you have been captured by an enemy force, that your cause is a just one, that you are right and that the enemy is wrong and that as a soldier you have taken the chance expected of a soldier and that there is nothing to be ashamed of in being captured.
    2. You must bear in mind that the treatment meted out to you is designed to break you and so bleed you of all the information you may have with regard to the organisation to which you belong.
    3. They will attempt to intimidate you by sheer numbers and by brutality. Volunteers who may feel disappointed are entering the first dangerous threshold because the police will act upon this disappointment to the detriment of the volunteer and to the furtherment of their own ends. Volunteers must condition themselves that they can be arrested and if and when arrested they should expect the worse and be prepared for it.
    After the prisoner has been placed in a cell, he may be left for some time alone. During this lull, police officers, `The Interrogators`, will crowd around the outside of the cell door from time to time, shouting threats and insults, telling the prisoner what they will do to him when they go into the cell.
    After some time the interrogators will enter the cell and ask the prisoner to make a confession. During this period he may be subjected to assaults and abusive language, depending on the circumstances surrounding the charge. At this stage he will be fingerprinted and other questions will be put to him, related to the specific charge or other charges. Usually his name and address will be taken, place of employment, occupation, educational standard and so forth. After this he will be again isolated in his cell while his `interrogators` check his identity, usually with local police, his home and place of employment. In this period of time the police will attempt to establish his political beliefs, if any, his associates, his police record, if any, and in this way build up a file on him.
    Most probably `his associates` and general pattern of movement will give a pretty good idea to the police, if the person is involved in or is sympathetic to a political organisation. Armed with this body of information the police will re-enter the cell and accuse the prisoner of all sorts of activity. If the evidence does not indicate a degree of guilt on the specific charge, he will be accused of all kinds of vague activity.
    The purpose of these vague accusations is to implant a feeling of guilt in the prisoner. If, however, the police have some evidence or strong beliefs, linking him with a specific charge, pressure will be applied immediately. This pressure will take the form of physical and psychological torture, most probably he will be punched and kicked around the cell while they scream at him to make a confession, indicating to him that they know all. One or more of the interrogating officers will act in a particular and brutal manner, if they fail to get a confession or on admission of guilt they will leave the cell, telling the prisoner they will be back and threatening him with the most barbaric forms of torture, implying that they extracted confessions from better men than he.
    Another set of interrogators will enter the cell, possibly carrying a file with the prisoner’s name written on it. They will act quite friendly and sympathetic towards him, telling him that they do not condone the activity of the previous interrogators, that they were mad, crazy and possibly they will kill him when they come in later, they will go to extremes to impress the prisoner of their own sympathy towards him, and ask him to make a confession to them indicating that they do not want the previous interrogators `to get at him again`.
    They will probably guarantee him that if he makes the confession they will not allow the former interrogators to re-enter the cell, this will be coupled with a warning that otherwise they cannot guarantee him safety. When the prisoner refuses to confess they will pretend to become very annoyed and disappointed at his lack of co-operation. They may strike him across the face or in the stomach while telling him that he ought to be thankful to them, that they saved him from the previous interrogators and indicating that his behaviour and attitude is a thankless way to repay their kindness.
    The interrogators will then open up a file and pretend to read extracts from it, related to the prisoner’s past life and activities, even the most intimate and private aspects of his life will be read to him, and possibly a general account of his movements and associates. Most of this information may have been supplied by his friends, employer, school, family, or girlfriend, it may also be `Pub Talk`, local gossip, information supplied by touts or information extracted from other prisoners. This detailed information is designed to frighten the prisoner and to shatter his confidence in his associates and organisation. If, however, they get no confession, they will leave the cell, but before doing so they will give the prisoner their names and tell him to ask for them at any time he wishes to, again indicating that the next set of interrogators are crazy, drunk, and will do him severe damage, then they leave the cell.
    After a period of time another set of interrogators will enter the cell, again these interrogators will be particularly brutal and nasty towards him. They will attack him immediately in a most hostile and vicious manner, suggesting to him that if he did not confess to the former interrogators he will confess to them, they will let him know that they have a reputation for getting confessions from people like him, implying that everyone they met confessed before they were finished with them.
    The torture used will now take on a three-fold purpose:
    1. Physical Torture.
    2. Subtle Psychological Torture.
    3. Humiliation.
    1. Physical Torture
    The physical torture will be in the form of beatings, kicking, punching and twisting of limbs, it may even be burning from cigarette ends.
    2. Psychological Torture
    This will be in the form of threats to his family, his friends and himself, e.g. threats of assassination and threats to castrate him
    3. Humiliation
    This takes the form of stripping the prisoner of his clothes and remarks passed about his sexual organs. This period of interrogation may last for as long as two hours or more and at the end of that period they may produce a factual or faked confession from an associate. Failing to get their confession they leave the cell, telling him they will be back and when they do come back they will break every bone in his body.
    This process can continue for seven days without a break, the minimum of sleep is allowed and if they deem it necessary, no sleep will be allowed. Lack of sleep causes the prisoner to become confused.
    Because of the existing laws which authorise the police to detain a person for seven days, it means in effect that the process of interrogation can continue to disorientate their victim, due in the main to lack of sleep.
    Interrogation can have many different phases, depending on the evidence or information which the police have gathered. It is obvious that a volunteer captured carrying out an operation is already seen to be guilty, especially if captured with a weapon, bomb etc., in this case the police have all the evidence needed to obtain a conviction and interrogation becomes unnecessary. Most likely the volunteer will be beaten up in the police stations for what he has done, not for what he knows, if interrogated under these circumstances it will be to get information on the organisation to which he belongs and on his comrades. Another shady aspect directly related to interrogation is blackmail and bribe. When the police cannot obtain a confession they may attempt to blackmail the volunteer, this may be in the form of threats to spread scandalous stories about the volunteer, stories or threats may be designed to hit at the character of the volunteer such as a threat to tell his comrades or his organisation that he told everything or that he had been working for them for years. The other phase of this shady interrogation is bribe. A volunteer may be promised money, a passport and a safe passage to any country he so desires if he co-operates.
    The best defence in anti-interrogation techniques is to understand the techniques as practised by police forces. The purpose of interrogation is to get a confession. If the interrogators knew what they were searching for there would be no need for interrogation, therefore interrogation is necessary only when the police are unaware of information, which would lead to a conviction. The best anti-interrogation is to SAY NOTHING. All police forces work from a story, suspicion or clue, therefore when a volunteer is arrested they strive to build on that clue, on that suspicion and the only way that can be done is to obtain information from their victim. They usually start by questioning their victim, writing down a recording of what he says, comparing this information with information already in their possession, looking for differences which contradict the information previously gained, going back to their victim, pointing out these differences, resulting in the victim changing his alibi in order to suit this difference. The police will again check this new story with other information and again look for a difference or mistake narrowing the prisoner’s alibi down until finally it breaks. All of these changes in his statements will be recorded and used as evidence against him, evidence which will without doubt be accepted by the court and so lead to his conviction. This cannot be over stressed: when arrested SAY NOTHING. Ask to see your solicitor and doctor immediately and keep on doing so.
    After the prisoner had been placed in his cell, we have seen earlier in the lecture how the police had crowded outside the cell door shouting insults and banging on the door. The purpose of this exercise is to frighten the prisoner and so arouse anxiety in their victim. When anxiety has been aroused all natural, rational defence barriers break down or weaken. When this happens the prisoner becomes irrational and becomes more prone to interrogation, in other words an anxious man is easier to intimidate by interrogation than a cool, calculating person. During the time the prisoner is left alone in the cell he should, in as far is as possible, ignore the police, the threats and the insults and he should marshal all facts surrounding his arrest. He should bear in mind that he can be detained for no more than seven days if he remains silent or possibly years in prison if he speaks. Most volunteers speak from a sense of fear thinking mistakenly that if they speak, torture or ill treatment will not be used. It is a recorded fact that interrogators are guided by a simple rule of thumb: `If a prisoner won’t speak he may be innocent and interrogation may be a waste of time, if he speaks a little there is always more and so interrogation is necessary`, therefore the prisoner who speaks a little in order to avoid abuse is in effect inviting more abuse from his interrogators who will always assume there is something more. Therefore the best defence is to remain COOL, COLLECTED, CALM, and SAY NOTHING.
    We have seen earlier in the lecture how the first batch of interrogators will enter the cell usually insulting, shouting and beating the prisoner. Volunteers should understand that this first batch of interrogators usually fingerprint, ask name, address etc. At this stage a little is known about the prisoner and therefore the task of the interrogator is to identify him positively. Again the prisoner must bear in mind that everything he says will be recorded and compared with existing information in the possession of the police. The purpose of abusing the prisoner at this stage is called the `softening up period`, usually one or more will act in a particularly nasty manner. This interrogation may last not more than one hour and is only a preliminary investigation. The purpose of using heavy-handed techniques and sheer hostility is an opening for the following batch of interrogators, whom we have seen act in a particularly sympathetic manner.
    This set of interrogators, we have seen, acted in a friendly and sympathetic manner towards the prisoner, offering him cigarettes and friendship. Volunteers should be well aware and on guard against this feigned friendship. These interrogators pretend to be sympathetic towards the aims and objects of the movement, going to lengths to impress the volunteer, pretending that they too believe in a united Ireland. They will, no doubt, tell the volunteer that their father or grandfather was in the same organisation and that they were forced by economic circumstances to join the police force and they are now merely passing the time until they are pensioned off. They will try to convince the volunteer it is in his interest to make a confession to them in order to escape from the previous interrogators who, they claim, are anti-Republican and no and are not interested in getting a confession but are only interested in beating the prisoner up. The volunteer should understand that these seemingly kind police officers may be acting the tough cop with his comrades who had been or are arrested. Finally we have seen how these interrogators, pretending to become upset, had stretched forward and beat the volunteer about the face and body, declaring that their advice and friendship was being returned or repaid with a stubborn attitude and a refusal to make EVEN A PART OF A CONFESSION. This technique is as old as police forces, they attempt to win over the friendship and trust of the prisoner, hoping that if their prisoner falls into that trap he will become upset, not so much at the punching about the face which he received from them but at his own refusal to co-operate: this perhaps is the most dangerous type of interrogation and one which leaves the prisoner in a psychological vulnerable position.
    Another technique is called TOP SECRET FILE TECHNIQUE, this involves the interrogators bringing into the cell a file with the prisoner’s name printed on it. The police will open this file in the presence of the prisoner as we have seen earlier in the lecture. They proceed to read from this file parts of the prisoner’s past life, even to the most intimate details and a general account of his movement and friends, especially those associated or known to have contacts or sympathies with a political organisation, e.g., Sinn Fein. They also have information gathered from various sources such as employer, neighbours, PUB TALK OR LOCAL GOSSIP. Very often the PUB TALK and gossip is factual, this arises from the volunteer or volunteers in general speaking in pubs under the influence of alcohol, telling close friends and girlfriends and boasting in a bravado manner about their exploits and the exploits of others. This type of bravado is POSITIVELY DANGEROUS, not only to the volunteer and his associates but to the Movement in general. Another dangerous aspect of interrogation is `an associate’s confession`, this involves an interrogator approaching the volunteer with a signed or unsigned, factual or unfactual confession of an associate. Volunteers must understand, (in the first place) this confession may be a hoax and in the second, even if it is a factual confession of his associate, this confession is not an indication of guilt and will not be accepted in court unless his associate who made the confession is prepared to turn State or Crown witness and is prepared to swear its truth in the witness box. Very often a volunteer may break under severe physical and psychological torture and make a confession, but rarely is prepared to turn Crown or State witness and swear against his comrades. If this technique is employed by the police DON`T FALL FOR IT, it is a trick to weaken the volunteer and so get him to make and sign a statement.
    Another dangerous technique employed is bringing the prisoner who made a statement into the same room as the volunteer who refuses to co-operate, usually they are left on their own and the prisoner who made a statement may try to entice his comrade to do likewise. If this happens to you always bear in mind that you are not alone because the room is always bugged and any talk is recorded. Another important point to bear in mind is when the prisoner who confessed and perhaps implicated you approaches, don’t launch a verbal attack on him because this verbal attack on him would be an implication of your guilt. Always speak friendly to him and suggest he must be mistaken, that he is ill and advise him to seek medical attention.
    Another important point to be remembered and one which is extremely important, DON`T GET INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL CONVERSATION, this technique is a universal tactic and one which recurs repeatedly. When volunteers refuse to make a confession and when all other tactics of interrogation have failed, the police usually, if not always, attempt to get the volunteer to speak on political matters. This is a technique which many volunteers fail to recognise, its purpose is to fling the volunteer off balance, to sound out his political thinking, to break his silence and so make it easier for him to speak freely. This tactic has been used against volunteers and very often to their own detriment. When a volunteer has been arrested and the usual terror tactics used against him, this display of friendship has a weakening effect upon him and can be explained in psychological terms.
    As we have seen earlier in this lecture, these seemingly friendly interrogators will give their names to the prisoner before they leave the cell, telling him that the next set of interrogators are crazy, anti-Republicans who are out to do him harm, they will tell him to call upon them at any time he so wishes and they will do their best to save him from brutal treatment. All volunteers must understand and understand in the clearest possible way that no interrogator is his friend, that they are the enemy, the instruments of coercion, the tools of suppression and a more dangerous enemy than the interrogators who will beat him up. These people act a part in a well-rehearsed play, and are using subtle psychological techniques in order to undermine the morale of the volunteer. All volunteers are well versed in brutal treatment as practised by police and the Army. They understand what physical torture means, but now you will have to understand the meaning and application of psychological torture, perhaps the term is an uncommon one, but its effects are far reaching.
    We have seen earlier in the lecture how the ‘heavy squad’ now enters the scene and proceeds to attack the volunteer in a most vicious and brutal manner. This shock treatment is well rehearsed and is meant to push the volunteer into a physical and mental corner, in other words they hope that their shock treatment will knock the volunteer off balance, and off guard in the hope that he will confess. They will shout statements to the effect that they have a reputation for extracting confessions, that they have never yet failed and that he will not fool them. Now we must analyse this approach, the first thing of importance we note of importance is the shouting in conjunction with the physical torture. The shouting as we shall see is a more important interrogation technique than the physical torture. Again, why shout? Why boast? Why tell the volunteer that they are experts at extracting information? This shouting and boasting is merely an assurance to the police that they can get a confession, it is the first obvious sign of their own weakness, a compensation for their own shortcomings and all volunteers should and ought to look upon this display as a modern war dance. Just as primitive people held war dances, and built totem poles in order to compensate themselves for their own known weaknesses, so two frustrated interrogators will shout and boast in front of the prisoner to compensate themselves for their own weakness. The best anti-interrogation technique when a volunteer finds himself in this situation, is to look upon the police officers as he would look upon primitive people, wearing the head of a dead animal, hoping that by doing this they gain the strength or cunning of the animal whose head they wear. All volunteers should look upon shouting, boasting policemen as they would look upon primitive people doing a war dance.
    We have seen that this type of torture is widespread and usually in the form of threats to the volunteer in question, to his friends and family, threats to assassinate him, to blacken his character, to castrate him; loss of sleep, poor quality of food and continuous noise. This in conjunction with the physical torture and fear of physical torture builds up anxiety and borders on hysteria. All of this is designed to smash down the volunteer’s natural defence mechanism, usually a person held for a period of time, perhaps seven days, living in an environment of fear and indecision, constantly being threatened, cut off from all natural contacts, deprived of his usual social surroundings, lack of sleep etc. This can and does form disorientation and disillusionment: during this period the volunteer will get no sleep or very little sleep, living this type of vague existence for a number of days and can leave its mark and deserves an independent lecture.
    [The sexual overtones of some interrogation techniques are graphically described in a section devoted to humiliation.]
    We have seen that this type of interrogation technique invariably is stripping the prisoner of all his clothes and remarks passed about his sexual organs. Volunteers should be aware of the proven fact that clothes are an important aspect of the individual’s character or make up. By removing his clothes the interrogators hope to remove the volunteer’s character and make up, psychologically this is symbolic and by doing this the police like to humiliate the volunteer and so lift away the barriers, just as they find barriers preventing them from getting a confession. A person’s clothes become symbolic of this barrier and by removing them they hope to remove the natural defence mechanism of the volunteer.
    The second part of the humiliation is to pass derogatory remarks about the volunteer’s sexual organs. This is quite common in all police stations, North, South, and in England. Volunteers should attempt to understand the mentality which underlies this act and so be better prepared to meet this angle if and when it happens to them. Just as they removed the volunteer’s clothes, which symbolised a defence mechanism or natural barrier, so too by passing derogatory remarks about the volunteer’s sexual organs they attempt to humiliate the volunteer and by so doing to weaken his will to resist. The mere act of doing this has deeper undertones than one would guess. Volunteers should understand that from a psychological point of view this act is called a penis complex. This complex is inherent in the homosexual and although the interrogators themselves may be married men with a family it indicates suppressed homosexual tendencies. When the volunteer realises and understands this proven fact he should not have great difficulty in triumphing over his interrogators. He should look upon them as homosexuals with the immunity of the establishment, as people who become sadistic from the homosexual tendencies, which underlie them.
    The police sometimes attempt to use blackmail and bribe in the last vain attempt to obtain a confession. All volunteers should ignore this type of carrot dangling. Blackmail rarely works effectively and can backfire against the police in libellous action and so bad publicity. Bribe never works, despite the fact that a volunteer may be offered money and protection in exchange for information. He should bear in mind that when he is of no further use to the police they drop him and the protection means nothing, for example, Kenneth Lennon.
    [Lennon was found dead in a ditch after the IRA tracked him down - in England.]
    While being tortured in a brutal, physical manner it is important that a volunteer should consolidate his position, he should realise that it’s seven days if he keeps silent, perhaps seventeen years if he speaks. It’s no easy thing to dismiss physical torture as a small or meaningless thing. It is by no means small and by no means meaningless to the receiver. From time immemorial, from histories recorded as far back as the Babylonian Empire up through the days of Imperial Rome, from the Spanish Inquisition to Nazi Concentration Camps, Free State and British police stations, come stories of how people coped and defeated the attempts of police to beat information from prisoners.
    One notable technique was the prisoners’ ability to form images in their minds or on the surrounding walls. People who were brutalised found that by directing their powers of concentration away from their interrogators and diverting it to images formed in their own mind they could in effect overcome the physical pain. Some people pictured images in their own mind or in the mind’s eye, this picture may have been a flickering candlelight, a leaf or a flower, but by concentrating upon it, by building it and by stabilising it, it seemed to attract their concentration so strongly in fact, that the physical abuse became meaningless. This mental exercise is called by some psychologists ‘mind over matter’ and is said to be a highly successfully and invincible anti-interrogation technique.
    Little is known of the laws surrounding this technique but all authorities associated with its research maintain that people under severe physical and mental pressure seem to adapt themselves to this state. People without previous experience or knowledge of the subject, but who under interrogation stumbled across this technique maintained that it worked but they did not know why.
    Again, some people found that by staring at a certain spot on a cell wall they experienced a similar sensation. It may be that the ancient Indian practice of Yoga has close or similar sensations, but one thing is certain is that when a person’s concentration is directed away from his interrogators he seems to triumph and perhaps torture is a m

  • Heureusement que le ridicule ne tue pas.....

    Dans la catégorie "Je vois des officiers de la CIA partout y compris la ou ils ne sont pas", palme d'or (Soyons fous) a la radio nicaraguayenne ,avec cet article remonté des archives en date de 1988. 


     United Press International

    April 13, 1988, Wednesday, AM cycle


    SECTION: International

    LENGTH: 469 words

    DATELINE: MANAGUA, Nicaragua

     Richard Melton, the new U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua, arrived Tuesday in Managua to take up his post at a ''decisive moment'' in relations between the two countries.
    Hours before Melton's arrival, the Nicaraguan state-run radio station accused the American envoy of being a CIA agent.
    Melton, 53, arrived at Augusto Cesar Sandino Airport on a flight from Costa Rica aboard a Panamanian airlines COPA passenger jet.
    ''This is a decisive moment in relations between the United States and Nicaragua,'' Melton said in Spanish at a news conference. ''Events in the near future will define not only the course of our bilateral relations but also the possibility of national reconciliation among all Nicaraguans.''
    No Nicaraguan officials were on hand to greet Melton. Security was provided by U.S. Embassy personnel.
    Melton, who had headed the State Department's office of Central American and Panamanian affairs since 1985, is the first U.S. ambassador sent to Nicaragua since last July, when Ambassador Harry Bergold finished a three-year term and returned to Washington.
    Melton's arrived in Nicaragua during delicate cease-fire negotiations between the Sandinista government and U.S.-backed Contra rebels. A high-level meeting of the two sides was tentatively scheduled to begin Friday in Managua.
    Radio Sandino, in its announcement of Melton's arrival, claimed he is a CIA operative.
    ''This man is obviously of the CIA,'' the official radio station said. ''He worked in Nicaragua under (former ruler) Anastasio Somoza and then went directly to the Dominican Republic, and we all know what happened there.''
    Melton decided to leave his three children back in the United States ''probably because he does not want them to be contaminated by communism,'' the broadcast said.
    The Somoza family's 43-year-old dictatorship in Nicaragua ended in 1979 with the ouster of President Anastasio Somoza-Debayle by the Sandinista National Liberation Front
    Melton served from 1963 to 1965 as an economic officer at the U.S. Embassy in Managua and was then sent to the Dominican Republic in the same capacity from 1965 to 1967.
    The United States, under the auspices of the Organization of American States, sent Marines to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to quell a rebellion led by a Dominican military officer suspected of being a communist. Honduras, Brazil and Nicaragua also sent troops.
    Melton has a long record of diplomatic service, which he began when he joined the State Department in 1961 after a three-year stint in the U.S. Army.
    His previous experience includes posts as vice consul in Recife, Brazil, 1967-69, first secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, 1975-78, first secretary at the U.S. Embassy in London, 1979-80, and deputy chief of mission in Montevideo, Uruguay, 1982-85.

     Si Richard Melton est un officier de la CIA ( Et non pas "agent", un terme désignant les informateurs et non les officiers traitants ,bande d'andouilles incultes boursouflées d'ingratitude aveugle) alors il aurait dû y faire tout ou partie de sa carrière, dans les postes décrits dans cet article.Et vu sa carrière donc il a été chef de station quand même. Or:

    Et d'une de 1975 a 1977 ( Quand il était en poste a Lisbonne) le chef de station de Lisbonne était David D.Whipple, et son homologue a Londres de 1979 a 1981 Richard Stolz

    Et de deux un officier de la CIA voire le chef de station ou son adjoint n'occupent jamais la couverture de chef de mission adjoint d'une ambassade ( Référence a son poste en Uruguay de 1982 a 1985) pour des raisons de répartitions des postes entre la CIA et le Département d'Etat, dans les ambassades.

    Et de trois je n'ai jamais vu un officier de la CIA devenir ambassadeur sans que cela fasse les joies du Washington Post ( Les carrières de fonctionnaires de la CIA James Lilley , Joseph DeTrani, Leslie Ireland , David Barry Kelly ou Donald Gregg ont été divulguées après qu'ils aient quittés la CIA pour travailler comme ambassadeurs, responsables au Conseil National de Sécurité US ou adjoints du directeur National du Renseignement)

    Non mais! 


  • Séminaire des services de sécurité francais et russe sur la criminalité informatique

    Un communiqué de l'agence de presse russe INTERFAX en date du 17.10.2007 et publié sur le site du FSB de la Fédération de Russie fait état du séminaire qui s'est  tenu récémment a Moscou sur la sécurité Internet, et qui selon le centre des relations publiques du FSB a été organisé a l'initiative de l'ambassade de France a Moscou.

    Ont pris part au séminaire des officiers des services francais , sans plus de précision (On peut supposer que est fait allusion aux spécialistes de la criminalité informatique de la Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire francaise, de la Division informatique de la DST et a leurs homologues de la DGSE) ainsi que des officiers du MVD ( Le Ministère de l'Intérieur russe) et du FSB (Sans doute du département de sécurité informatique de la 1ère Division [Contre-espionnage] du FSB), ainsi que des représentants de sociétés privées francaises et russes spécialisées dans la sécurité de l'information.

    Ont été , au cours du séminaire, analysées les questions de la sécurité informatique , les insuffisances juridiques dans les législations nationales et internationales dans ce domaine et les possibilités d'y remédier, sans oublier les expériences des participants dans le domaine de la lutte contre la criminalité informatique et du commerce éléctronique. Le Centre des relations publiques du FSB a noté les déclarations de l'ambassadeur de France a Moscou, Stanislas De Laboulaye, qui éspère que de tels séminaires seront fréquents et permettront de renforcer la coopération entre les différents services.



  • Une organisation plus efficace

    Nouvelle réorganisation du Blog "La communauté du renseignement" , pour plus d'efficacité. le blog sera désormais divisé en sections   "géographiques"  ( Le lieu ou se passe l'activité du service secret décrit), le pays du service (Services secrets britanniques, exemple) ainsi que la thématique (L'article relatif aux armes de destruction massives sera donc dans la rubrique WMD)


    Donc l'article relatif a la biographie de John Brennan, qui a été chef de station de la CIA a Riyadh (Arabie Saoudite) de 1996 a 1999 et qui s'est trouvé au coeur de la lutte antiterroriste sera ainsi classé:

    Secteur géographique:Moyen-Orient (Le lieu ou Brennan aété en poste)

    Thématiques: Biographie et Terrorisme

    Service secret: Américain 




    Il n'était connu que sous son pseudo a la CIA , CURVEBALL, pseudo connu depuis plusieurs années du public. Sa véritable identité est désormais révélée:


    Rafid Ahmed Alwan ,ingénieur chimiste irakien passé en Allemagne en 2000, a joué un rôle important dans un des événements les plus majeurs de la zone Moyen-Orient : C'est,entre autres, sur la base de ses informations, affirmant que le régime de Saddam Hussein possède un programme d'armes biologiques, et auquel se référa le secrétaire d'Etat américain Colin Powell lors de sa célèbre allocution du 05.02.2003 a l' ONU, que les Etats-Unis et plusieurs pays alliés (Entre autres la Grande-Bretagne, l'italie, l'Espagne) renversèrent le régime de Saddam Hussein.


    b0ac377ffebdc8b34dc83f30a553d587.jpgAlan Foley                  Aujourd'hui ,il s'avére que les informations de "Curveball" étaient fausses. Débriéfé par le BND, le service de renseignement fédéral ouest-allemand, ses informations avaient été passées a la communauté US du renseignement. Les témoignages obtenus montrent bien, pourtant, que bien avant que l'Irak ne soit envahie, les informations de Curveball ne sont pas fiables. Témoignent en ce sens deux hauts responsables de la CIA a l'époque: Tyler Drumhueller dirigeait alors la Division Europe de l'Ouest de la Direction des Opérations de la CIA (Après avoir servi a Vienne comme Chef de station) et Alan Foley, ancien spécialiste de l'analyse des informations sur les armements soviétiques, qui en 2003 dirigeait le WINPAC (Weapons, Intelligence, Non-Prolifération and Arms Control Center) , une division analytique de la CIA chargée de l'analyse d'informations sur les armes , y compris chimiques ou biologiques.Pourtant, on utilisera les informations de Curveball, y compris lors du discours de Colin Powell.... Pour l'instant il n'a pas été possible de déterminer exactement ce qui s'était passé au niveau de la circulation de ses informations.


    Le National Security Archive de l'université George Washington, que je félicite au passage pour ses dossiers toujours réellement passionants, vient de publier des documents, certains déclassifiés, sur CURVEBALL et la valeur de ses informations, sur son site 

  • Guojia Anquanbu :Anatomie (2ème partie)



    Parmi les priorités du MSS,aussi bien la lutte contre les espions étrangers que contre les opposants politiques.Par exemple,les proches du Dalaï Lama,ou la secte Falungong. Nombre d'affaires le démontreront

    En décembre 1995, le MSS de Lhassa, dirigé par Gaisang Qupei, neutralise un groupe de tibétains qui tentait de recruter des compatriotes pour faire de l'espionnage. En sens inverse, en novembre 1995, le contre-espionage indien avait neutralisé trois chinois qui tentaient d'espionner le Dalaï Lama (Une des principales bases de refuges des tibétains fuyant la Chine communiste est l'Inde).

    Un autre problème suscite la préoccupation des autorités chinoises, et c'est au MSS de s'y coller : La lutte antiterroriste. Mention particulière au terrorisme ouïgour.


    En mars 1997, plusieurs bombes explosent a Pékin, Lhassa, et Urumqi (Province du Xinjiang). En effet, dans cette dernière province existe une ethnie ouïgoure (musulmane), qui se bat depuis plusieurs siècles pour obtenir un Etat indépendant. Le MSS décide d'agir, sous le commandement de Zhang Ruihua, chef du bureau MSS Xinjinag, et de Gaisang Qupei, qui dirige toujours l'antenne de Lhassa. Les autorités chinoises, en effet, n'excluent pas une alliance,alors,entre ouïgours et tibétains,étant donné la simultanéité des attentats. Le MSS décide aussi d'installer une section musulmane a Shanghaï .C'est une occasion aussi d'établir des relations avec la DGSE francaise, qui combat de son côté le crime organisé chinois.


    Les information actuelles montrent clairement une activation du MSS hors des frontières chinoises: le Directeur du Renseignement National US déclarera publiquement en 2007 que les services secrets chinois et russes comptent parmi les plus agressifs dans la collecte de renseignements sur le sol américain, tandis que dans un rapport, le BFV, le contre-espionnage fédéral allemand, s'inquiétant de la vente par la Chine d'ordinateurs qui auraient été piégés aux institutions allemandes.


    Voici ce que note par exemple un rapport, "Report to Congress on Chinese espionnage activities against the United States" en date du 01.01.2000, relatif a l'année fiscale 1998. Destiné au Congrès américain, ce rapport a été déclassifié l'année dernière, en janvier 2006 :

    En premier lieu sont rappelées les priorités pour la sécurité nationale chinoise, a savoir le maintien de la stabilité intérieure, la collecte de renseignements a caractère scientifique et technologique et destiné a aider au développement économique de la Chine, la surveillance des développements touchant Taïwan et les intérêts intrenationaux chinois.Le rapport estime aussi que,en date de 1998, la collecte de renseignements est l'oeuvre,en majorité,de non-professionels du renseignements, d'individus et d'organisations agissant hors du contrôle des services secrets chinois. Ce sont des entreprises, des compagnies privées, des Instituts de recherche, qui ont pour but de collecter des renseignements,pour en profiter a titre privé. Les services secrets chinois, estime le rapport, ont plus pour habitude d'utiliser des étudiants chinois pour la collecte du renseignements, et de souligner que beaucoup d'étudiants chinois aux Etats-Unis étudient les sciences, leur donnant ainsi la possibilité une grande variété de renseignements dans le domaine des technologies.

    Rappelant ensuite les différents services de renseignements extérieurs chinois, a savoir le MSS, le Qingbao (Renseignement militaire) et le Departement de Liaison ,une unité du département politique de l'Armée Populaire de Libération chargé de la collecte du renseignement contre Taïwan, le rapport détaille ensuite sur le travail des services secrets chinois contre les Etats-Unis:

    Dans le domaine du renseignement politique, estime le rapport, Beijing continue a voir les Etats-Unis comme une de leurs cibles majeures dans la collecte du renseignement.Une attention particulière est portée a la politique étrangère et aux intentions des Etats-Unis ,ainsi que sur les leaders américains et les négociations bilatérales ou multilatérales sensibles.

    Concernant le renseignement militaire, il est surtout conduit par les attachés militaires chinois ,aussi bien du bureau de l'attaché militaire a l'ambassade de la République Popualire de Chine a Washington que du Comité d'Etat-Major des Nations Unies a New York. La collecte du renseignement se fait souvent par les méthodes "ouvertes" (lecture de journaux spécialisés, observation..), mais depuis 1987, le FBI et les Douanes auraient détéctées deux opérations clandestines conduites par le Qingbao aux Etats-Unis.Priorité est donnée aux technologies militaires américaines, ou aux opérations militaires américaines,sans oublier les ventes d'armement militaire a Taïwan.

    Dans le domaine du renseignement économique, le rapport note que c'est une priorité pour les services secrets chinois,entre autres pour le MSS ,qui agit,étant donné ses fonctions ,aussi bien sur le territoire américain que en Chine.Le MSS serait particulièrement actif contre les hommes d'affaires occidentaux,surtout en Chine. Quant aux personnes d'origine chinoise, elle sont évidemment l'objet de tentatives de recrutement du MSS. Toutefois,la part de renseignements collectés dans le domaine scientifique et technique en Chine même est faible, par rapport au travail de renseignement hors de la Chine.

    Durant les 20 dernières années,la Chine a donc établie des réseaux solides aux Etats-Unis même, avec pour cible aussi bien les institutions étatiques que les entreprises privées, les académies, les instituts, laboratoires, toutes personnes impliquées dans un travail donnant accès a des informations confidentielles.



    Parfois,des scandales apparaissent: en 2005,un cadre du MSS fait déféction en Australie et révèle que le MSS a pour principale cible la secte Falungong. En 2006, c'est un codeur japonais qui se suicide. Dans la note qu'il laisse, il affirmera avoir subi un chantage du MSS,quand il était a Shanghaï (Chef du MSS Shanghaï: Cai Xumin)

    La priorité reste toutefois l'adversaire,les services secrets taïwanais,comme le montre le scandale qui vient d'éclater:

    Fin septembre 2007, Lin Yu-Nung, un officier du Bureau du renseignement du Ministère de la Justice taïwanais, est interpellé: Il avait été recruté par les services secrets chinois. Son recruteur Chen Chih-Kao, est un ancien collègue de travail "retourné" en 2005 par les services secrets chinois a Shanghaï.Le MSS peut,pour ses opérations, aussi se baser sur une communauté chinoise a l'étranger extrêmement vaste,et souvent bien implantée, pour la collecte de renseignements ou la couverture. Le Guojia Anquanbu s'est donc, au cours des dernières années, retrouvé confronté a nombre de tâches : Citons aussi son implantation a Hong Kong, depuis la rétrocession de la colonnie par la Grande-Bretagne en 1997.Selon "Intelligence Online",le MSS utilise la couverture du Security Department des services de renseignements politique de la Colonie,le Liaison Office of the Central Governement in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.Les opérations sont surtout menées depuis la Direction du MSS de Canton, dirigée par Xu An.Notons que les services secrets chinois privilégient,comme leurs homologues allemands du BND (Renseignement fédéral ouest-allemand) les couvertures commerciales .Ils utilisent aussi les couvertures diplomatiques,mais rien n'a permis de distinguer ,a mes yeux, dans les ambassades de Chine a l'étranger, les officiers du MSS de leur homologues du Ministère des affaires étrangères chinois.

    Restent toujours prioritaires aux yeux du MSS le travail en direction des pays de la zone Asie et le développement de ses réseaux de renseignements, sans compter une augmentation de son implantation en Afrique , auquel s'était déja efforcé son prédécesseur dans les années 60.Il s'agissait alors d'implanter le marxisme en Afrique; désormais il s'agit pour le MSS de s'implanter par le biais de l'économie, la Chine augmentant fortement son commerce et s'implantant en Afrique par des projets, des entreprises, des prêts a des taux extrêmement faibles (Voire nuls).


    Boris Eltsine approuve, par ce document du 04.08.1994, des negociations en vue d'un accord de cooperation entre le FSK et le Guoanbu

    Le Guoanbu entretient des relations avec nombres de services secrets. Par exemple,un acte administratif du 04.07.1994 de Boris Eltsine fait etat de negociations, en vue d'un accord de cooperation, entre le FSK (Service federal de contre-espionnage de la Federation de Russie, devenu en 1995 le FSB) et le Ministere de la Securite d'Etat de la Republique Populaire de Chine.  Début 2007, le MSS a établi des contacts avec la Sécurité ukrainienne, le SBU, et avec le service de la Sécurité d'Etat géorgien.


    Le MSS ne se contente pas de piquer les secrets dans les autres pays: Il doit aussi défendre les secrets chinois: Fin 2001 les autorités chinoises découvrent des micros dans le Boeing destiné au Président chinois, et qui a été fabriqué aux USA. Vers le début de l'année 2002, c'est le patron de la station de la CIA a Beijing, Stephen Holder, qui est déclaré "persona non grata" et expulsé par les chinois,pour des raisons inconnues. Selon "Intelligence Online" du 06.07.2007 (information a prendre avec prudence car elle n'a recu aucune confirmation) les services secrets nord-coréens se seraient également activés en Chine, surtout dans plusieurs provinces frontalières de la Corée du Nord. Plusieurs réseaux auraient été démantelés. Mais les chinois, qui ont aussi envoyés des officiers sous couverture en Corée du Nord, auraient également eus des pertes..

    Lorsque en septembre 2007 les autorités chinoises ont été accusées de pirater plusieurs sites internet, dont celui du Pentagone, elles ont niées et aussitôt rappelées que les services secrets occidentaux se livrent aux mêmes activités contre les Chinois..



    Xu Yongyue ( A gauche) , et son remplacant Geng Huishang (A droite)

    De 1998 a la mi-2007,le patron du Guojia Anquanbu était Xu Rongyue.Il a été remplacé a ce poste par Geng Huishang,55 ans,qui occupait depuis 1998 le poste de Vice-Ministre de la Sécurité d'Etat.Il est décrit comme un spécialiste de la protection des secrets commerciaux.

    Aujourd'hui,voici l'organigramme du Ministère de la Sécurité d'Etat.:

    Division opérationnelle :

    -1er département ,renseignement intérieur,chargé entre autres de recruter en Chine même des informateurs.

    -2ème département,opérations a l'étranger,et analyse des informations ainsi obtenues.

    -3ème département,opérations en direction de Hong Kong ,Macao, Taïwan.

    -4ème département, appui technique. (Appareils photos,micros etc..)

    -5ème département,coordination et direction du travail des services régionaux du Guoanbu.

    -6ème département, contre-espionnage.

    -7ème département,circulation,en fait le Département chargé d'analyser les informations venant des différents services du Guojia Anquanbu.

    -8ème département,Institut contemporain des relations internationales.

    -9ème département,sécurité interne du Guojia Anquanbu, et coordination des sections du contre-espionnage militaire au sein de l' APL.

    -10 ème département,collecte de renseignement économique,scientifique et technologique.

    -11ème département,renseignement éléctronique contre les autres pays, et sécurité informatique (Pour empêcher les intrusions des services secrets occidentaux dans les ordinateurs du Minsitère de la Sécurité d'Etat),ainsi que analyse des informations ainsi obtenues.En décembre 2003,le 11ème département était dirigé par Wu Shizhong.

    -Département des affaires étrangères,contacts avec les services de renseignements étrangers,et coordination de la coopération.


    Mes remerciements a :Fabrice,Roger Faligot,FAS.



  • La CIA au Vietnam

    Parmi les plus grandes défaites subies par les Etats-Unis reste incontestablement en tête la Guerre du Vietnam,de 1964 a 1973 ,qui sera suivie par l'invasion des viet-cong en 1975 et l'effondrement du régime de Vietnam du Sud.Les services secrets américains,et donc la CIA entre autres,ont joués un rôle très important dans ce conflit,en s'efforcant de collecter des renseignements sur l'ennemi viet-cong pour empêcher,selon la théorie des dominos,que si le Vietnam devienne communiste,les pays d'Asie alentour aussi. La CIA y engagera donc d'importants moyens et un nombre considérable d'officiers,faisant de la station de la CIA au Vietnam une des plus importantes numériquement. Y prendront part des chefs de stations, des analystes, des spécialistes de la Guerre psychologique. Voici la liste,qui sera progressivement mise a jour:


    Chefs de stations CIA a Saïgon

    Emmett Mc Carthy 1954-1955

    John G.Anderton 1955-1957. 

    Nicolas Natsios 1957-1959 

    William Colby 1959-1962.

    John H.Richardon 1962-1963

    David R.Smith (Acting chief of station)

    Peer de Silva 1964-1965

    John Lymond Hart 1966-1967

    Lewis Lapham 1967-1969

    Ted Shackley 1969-1972

    Thomas Polgar 1972-1975


    Officiers de la CIA a Saïgon 

    Alexander Shatton

    Donald Gregg 

    David Barry Kelly 

    George Weisz

    Joseph Lazarsky 

    Philip H.Potter

    Angelo Kalaris 

    Charles Merchant. 

    Clark Gilbert Myers

    Dean Almy

    Donald Healey 

    Donald Blascak

    Dorothy Lyman

    Edward J.Carroll

    Edward J.Doyle

    Felton Mark Wyatt

    Francis Somers.

    George Carver

    George W.Allen

    Helen Morgan

    Howard Rocky Stone

    James Delaney 

    James Hodges Parker

    John Singlaub 

    Joseph Baker

    Joseph McDonald 

    Louis Di Filippo

    Marcus Kostolich

    Michaël Capraro

    Nicholas Natsios

    Ogden Williams 

    Paul Harwood

    Philip Jones

    Richard Dorey

    Richard Sellew

    Robert Francis Brogodhy

    Robert R.Simmons

    Stanley Moscowitz

    Steven Kostic

    Ted Price

    Walter Krisa

    William C.Stewart 


    Complété le 23.10.2007 (Thanks to Aldartus) , 05.03.2008 et 06.03.2008

  • Guojia Anquanbu: Anatomie (1ère partie)


    Si il y a un service qui doit aujourd'hui attirer l'attention de la communauté du renseignement, c'est incontestablement celui-la. Le Guojia Anquanbu,créé en 1983,n'a cessé depuis de monter en puissance,aussi bien dans le domaine du renseignement extérieur que dans la lutte contre l'espionnage. On peut retenir ,par exemple,les déclarations de John Brenner, patron du NCIX (National Counterintelligence Executive) qui déclara en mars 2007 que les services secrets chinois sont parmi les plus actifs sur le territoire américain,déplorant les fuites de technologies vers la Chine communiste, et l'infiltration du contre-espionnage américain.Brenner citera en exemple l'affaire Leung, cette femme d'affaires chinoise arrêtée en 2003 qui a soutiré des informations a son amant, officier du FBI spécialiste de la Chine,puis les a transmises a Pékin.


    Le Guojia Anquanbu, appelé aussi Guoanbu, (Ministry of State Security, MSS)  a été créé le 06.06.1983, et fut inauguré le 01.07.1983.Officialisé  lors de la 1ère cession de la VI ème Assemblée Nationale Populaire. Il récupère les fonctions de contre-espionnage du Gonganbu,de renseignement extérieur qui était dévolu au Central Investigation Department (Diaochabu), et est aussi chargé de la protection des frontières et de la lutte contre les déviances idéologiques (Les opposants). Ses missions sont donc de protéger la souveraineté et les intérêts de l'Etat. Les tâches sont ainsi mieux séparées: Le Guojia Anquanbu s'occupe de la Sécurité de l'Etat,le Gonganbu de l'ordre public et de la lutte contre la criminalité.

    Ling Yun, vice-Ministre du Gonganbu depuis 1964, prend le commandement du nouveau Ministère de la Sécurité d'Etat,et dans une conférence de presse qui se tient peu après la création du service,fin juin 1983, il dénonce l'augmentation des activités d'espionnage contre la RPC et des sabotages, et fait appel a la population pour aider les services de la sécurité d'Etat a lutter contre les espions.

    A peine créé le Ministère de la Sécurité d'Etat se jette dans la bataille: Il faut a la fois lutter contre les sabotages, les réseaux des services secrets étrangers (Un des plus dangereux étant le renseignement taïwanais), mais aussi, avec la CIA , coordonner l'aide aux rebelles afghans se battant contre les soviétiques. En 1984, peu après la mort de Youri Andropov au Kremlin, le patron de la CIA Bill Casey se rend en Asie. De passage a Pékin, avec le chef de la Station de la CIA a Beijing Ted Price, il négociera avec Ling Yun l'aide aux moudjahidins afghans.

    Il faut aussi établir des contacts avec les autres services secrets. Ling Yun part donc a la tête d'une délégation pour Belgrade avec Yang Dezhong (Directeur-adjoint du département des affaires générales du Comité Central du Parti communiste chinois) ou il arrive le 29.02.1984 , avec pour but la coopération entre les services secrets des deux pays. Le 05.03.1984 ils seront recus par Franko Heoljvic, membre du Présidium du Parti communiste yougoslave, ce qui paraît démontrer l'intérêt des yougoslaves pour leurs homologues chinois. Une autre délégation du MSS arrivera a Belgrade le 09.10.1986, a l'invitation de Dobroslav Culafic, Secrétaire Fédéral pour les affaires intérieures. Elle est dirigée par Jia Chunwang, le remplacant de Ling Yun a la tête du Guojia Anquanbu. Pourquoi ce remplacement si rapide du Ministre?

    Le MSS remporte pourtant très vite ses premiers succès dans la lutte contre les services secrets étrangers , avec le démantèlement d'un réseau a la solde des services secrets taïwanais,ce qui paraît consolider la position de Ling Yun a la tête du MSS. L'information est rendue publique début 1985, mais on ignore quand les personnes ont été arrêtées et jugées.Leur condamnation,selon le MSS, aurait eu lieu peu avant. Ont interpellées trois personnes, parmi elles: Xin Peiwen, 46 ans, acteur dans une troupe culturelle de l'armée, qui aurait contacté les services secrets taïwanais en octobre 1983 et aurait fourni a ses services un document top-secret (il n'est pas précisé quoi) en mars 1984. Le rapport public du MSS accusera M.Peiwen d'avoir collecté des renseignements a caractère politique et militaire a Pékin et d'avoir incité des pilotes de l'armée de l'air a faire déféction. Les deux autres seraient Su Mao, 27 ans, musicien dans une troupe du Ballet de Pékin,et son oncle de 39 ans,acteur lui aussi dans une troupe,qui aurait commencé a travailler pour les taïwanais alors qu'il était a l'étranger en avril 1982. Ce n'est pas le premier coup du Guojia Anquanbu contre les services secrets de Formose,puisque selon un rapport du MSS,entre septembre 1984 et février 1985 12 personnes ont été identifiées comme espions taïwanais. L'une a même été éxécutée. Et Le service réussit aussi a neutraliser un informateur de la CIA, Lo Fu, un journaliste de Hong Kong.

    Mais quand il parlait de l'activation des services secrets contre la Chine, le Ministre de la Sécurité d'Etat ne croyait pas si bien dire,puisqu'il est confronté,a la mi-1985, a la déféction d'un cadre de son propre service;Yu Shenzan,du service du contre-espionnage du MSS,fuit a Hong Kong puis est exfiltré par la CIA...Devant le scandale, Ling Yun démissionne. Il est remplacé par Jia Chunwang, lequel conservera son poste de 1985 a 1998, avant d'être remplacé en mars 1998.

    ac630ce3badfb43e4c4e56e19fdddd83.jpgJia Chunwang, Ministre de la Sécurité d'Etat de 1985 a 1998. Il fut ensuite Ministre de la Sécurité Publique (La police chinoise) de 1998 a 2002. Il a ensuite exercé les fonctions de Procureur général adjoint du Parquet populaire suprême de décembre 2002 a mars 2003 avant d'être élu Procureur général du Parquet populaire suprême en mars 2003.

    Le MSS continue son travail, par exemple en mettant au point en 1987 une directive visant a limiter et contrôler les contacts entre chinois et étrangers. Le Parti communiste chinois prévient de son côté ses adhérents de ne pas parler avec les correspondants des journaux étrangers sans une autorisation expresse.. Seront par exemple expulsés le correspondant de l'AFP Lawrence Mc Donald en janvier 1987 ou son homologue japonais du Kyodo News Service Shuitsu Henmi en mai 1987.

    Le MSS se retrouve plus que jamais a lutter sur plusieurs front a la fois: Il s'implique donc aussi bien dans la répréssion des dissidents en 1989 (Lors des événements de la Place Tian An Men) que contre tout ce qui peut menacer le pouvoir chinois,en y voyant souvent la main des services secrets taïwanais, comme le montre l'article du 24.06.1989 de la BBC (en fin d'article).A l'occasion de la répression de la Place TianAnMen, plusieurs étudiants disparaissent. Certains réussissent a quitter la Chine,par l'intermédiaire de filières créées par les différents services de renseignement occidentaux (DGSE, CIA, MI6) et visant a les faire passer a Macao ou Hong-Kong.Cette opération est connue sous le nom de YELLOW BIRD. Le MSS tentera d'infiltrer ses filières,par exemple en dépêchant une équipe a Canton.

    D'autres étudiants sont eux arrêtés.Le MSS sera accusé d'avoir secrètement arrêté plusieurs étudiants,dont trois de Macao: Chen Tse-Wei, 29 ans; Chin Kuo-Tung,21 ans; Liang Tsao-Hua, 23 ans. Ils étudiaient a l'université de Canton. Leur interpellation a ensuite été confirmée par le Bureau de la Sécurité Publique de Canton,sans plus de précisions..

    Dans un rapport daté de fin 1989, le Guojia Anquanbu s'inquiète de l'augmentation du nombre d'affaires d'espionnages. Selon un rapport du Ministère,plus d'une centaine de personnes, en 1987 et 1988, ont été interpellées, travaillant aussi bien pour le gouvernement, l'armée, ou le domaine politique, pour espionnage. Le rapport constate que l'ouverture (économique,NDLR) de la Chine a attiré l'attention du monde entier,entraînant l'augmentation de l'attention des services secrets étrangers, en direction de la République Populaire de Chine. Encore confirmé dans la lutte contre les services secrets taïwanais, avec le démantèlement de plusieurs réseaux en 1990 (Voir l'article de la BBC du 20.08.1990 en bas, sur le sujet).

    Il faut y ajouter la menace contre les représentations chinoises a l'étranger, suite a la répréssion de la Place Tian An Men, qui oblige a augmenter la vigileance des officiers du MSS. 

    Et enfin,sur le front intérieur, le Tibet, annexé par la Chine sous Mao. Ce qui entraîne l'arrivée a Lhassa le 06.08.1990 du patron du Guojia Anquanbu, Jia Chunwang, accompagné d'une délégation, avec pour but d'inspecter l'antenne du MSS sur place. M.Chunwang déclarera ensuite au journaliste de la télévision tibétaine que la situation sur place est "stable". Cette inspection apparaît néanmoins importante,si on tient compte de sa longueur: La délégation restera au Tibet jusqu'au 22.08.1990, soit deux semaines.Il paraît quand même étonnant que le Ministre de la Sécurité d'Etat, qui ne s'est jusqu'a présent jamais montré a la télé,intervienne, et reste aussi longtemps au Tibet. Ses élements semblent clairement indiquer que la situation au Tibet est, aux yeux des autorités chinoises, très préoccupante. Le texte sur le sujet est en annexe 3.



    ANNEXE 1

    BBC June 24, 1989, Saturday


    LENGTH: 1973 words


    SOURCE: Peking television 1000 gmt 22 Jun 89

    Text of report (FE/0490 i)

    According to a news release from the Ministry of State Security, after strict investigations, state security organisations in Peking and other parts of China have cracked the cases of a number of secret agents of Taiwan's Kuomintang [KMT] who had a hand in the student unrest and turmoil occurring since mid-April, and have confiscated a mass of criminal evidence of their espionage activities.

    The KMT secret service in Taiwan has adopted various means through different channels to fan the so-called movement for freedom and democracy on the mainland, and plotted to stir up social turmoil to subvert the PRC's people's democratic regime. Since the student unrest and turmoil in Peking and other parts of China, the KMT secret service in Taiwan, while stepping up rumourmongering, instigation and demagogic reactionary propaganda against the mainland, had ordered its agents hidden on the mainland to take part directly in the turmoil and aggravate the situation in an attempt to escalate the so-called pro-democracy movement on the mainland into a general anti-communist and violent resistance movement. Hidden agents deployed by Taiwan's secret service on the mainland have also kept a close watch on the turmoil and collected and delivered information on the turbulent situation to espionage agencies outside China. Counter-revolutionary activities carried out by Taiwan's KMT secret agents hidden on the mainland have been exposed by China's state security organisations, and some KMT secret agents who had a hand in the turmoil have surrendered themselves to China's state security organisations. The following are some of the KMT espionage cases that have been uncovered

    The Peking municipal state security bureau detained, according to law, KMT secret agents Wang Changhong, Qian Rongmian and Liang Qiang on 19th and 27th May. [Video opens with shots of night scene, car speeding away, two plainclothes men escorting middle-aged man into building, then cut to show close-up shots of Wang and Qian, seated inside unidentified building and being interrogated]

    Secret agent Wang Changhong, 38, male, a former cadre at a Peking factory, joined the KMT secret service after Taiwan's Mainland Work Committee incited him to defect while he was abroad in 1988. In the wake of the turmoil in Peking, the KMT secret service appointed Wang Changhong a provincial level special agent, and instructed him to return to Peking to collect information on the turmoil and prepare to set up an undergorund Peking work committee. Upon returning to Peking on 27th April, Wang Changhong recruited Qian Rongmian, also a former factory cadre, as a secret agent, and informed the KMT secret service about China's turbulent situation. He also repeatedly spread rumours in Tiananmen Square, instigated turmoil, and mingled with the students on hunger strike, inciting them by saying the Government is inhuman. What is the use of keeping such a government? He also spread rumorus that the civilian police in Xian had beaten tens of students. Wang Changhong also suggessted to Taiwan's secret service that it is necessary to focus the current work on the workers' movement, in a vain attempt to stir up strikes and escalate the turmoil. After the case was brought to light, criminal evidence, including the secret codes for Wang Changhong to contact Taiwan's secret service, were discovered. [While the announcer reads the report, video shows still pictures and video clippings of Wang, standing in front of a crowd of young people with his right hand up in a ''V'' sign, mingling with the students on hunger strike, clapping his hands, raising both hands in a ''V'' sign, shouting to demonstrators, and checking mail inside a post office; occasionally video pauses to focus on Wang and circles him in red. After showing a small notebook written in code, some cash, letters, colour pictures and developed negatives, video focuses briefly on Wang being interrogated, and saying ''. . . contacted KMT relevant officials. . . '']
    Secret agent Liang Qian, 36, male, also a former Peking factory cadre, joined a Taiwan secret service organisation, the Mainland Work Committee, in 1986 when he studied abroad. He was appointed as a central special agent and sent back home. The Taiwan secret service organisation instructed him to recruit intellectuals for setting up organisations upon returning home. After the turmoil occurred in Peking, Liang Qiang bustled continuously between schools of higher learning and Tiananmen Square, making trouble, participating in disturbances and writing reactionary propaganda for the unlawful organisations the Peking College Students Autonomous Union and the Autonomous Federation of College Students from Other Places. He also drafted a declaration of the Chinese Unity Party, boasted of setting up another government, and secretly reported to the Taiwan secret service time and again about his activities. [Video shows shots of Liang being taken away by two plainclothes men, cuts to show Liang seated and being interrogated; it also shows still pictures and video clippings of Liang mingling with students at Tiananmen Square and on college campuses, pausing to focus on and circle him in red, as well as a sheet of paper with the heading ''Declaration of the Chinese Unity Party'']

    The Shanghai municipal state security bureau detained, according to law, KMT secret agents Qiu Lin, and Zhou Yan, Cao Weiguo, Feng Jin and Lu Zhengging on 7th and 14th June.

    Secret agent Qiu Lin, 30, male, a former newspaper reporter, left China to take up permanent residence abroad in 1986. Shortly after joining an espionage organisation of Taiwan's Military Intelligence Bureau in 1988, he was sent back home to carry out activities. During disturbances in Shanghai, the Taiwan espionage organisation repeatedly instructed him to exploit the new situation arising from the confrontation between the students and Chinese communists by fermenting the masses' solidarity for building the student movement to move in the direction of overthrowing the Chinese communist regime. Acting on the espionage organisation's arrangements, Qiu Lin manoeuvred everywhere, attending meetings at salons, and repeatedly reported the turbulent situation to the espionage organisation. After he was brought to light, the tools he used for writing secret letters and their original drafts were seized. [Video shows close-up shots of Qiu and an arrest warrant, cutting to show Qiu being interrogated, a still picture of him identified as Taiwan's special agent and alias Wu Mingxuan in parentheses; then it shows video clippings of Qiu talking to young people inside unidentified rooms and some letters; it also shows Qiu seated and answering questions, saying ''. . . established contacts through this method. . . I was given a code name and frequency, 4123 or 4223, . . . Li Daye's address was written in secret code].

    Secret agent Zhou Yan, 23, male, a former company worker in Shanghai, joined Taiwan's Military Intelligence Bureau while he was studying abroad at his own expense in 1988. Cao Weiguo, Feng Jin and Lu Zhengqing joined the Taiwan espionage organisation through Zhou Yan. In late April this year, Taiwan's espionage organisation instructed Zhou Yan to seize the current opportunity, take part in the student movement, and report back on fruitful achievements. Zhou Yan immediately collaborated with Feng Jin, Cao Weiguo and Lu Zhengqing in actively carrying out activities. They reported to the Taiwan espionage organisation We have formed teams to join demonstrations and to support the students, with a slogan I Love Money But I Love Even More Freedom and Democracy and that our appearance as the self-employed can give a strong impetus to the demonstrations, appeal greatly to the citizens and have a great influence. After the case was cracked, the state security organ seized criminal evidence, including the Taiwan espionage organisation's secret letters and instructions to Zhou Yan. [Video shows Zhou being taken out of a car and interrogated, cuts to show still pictures of Feng Jin, Cao Weiguo and Lu Zhengqing, as well as several letters; it also shows video clippings of demonstrations in Shanghai, without identifying any of the demonstrators]

    On 14th June the Guangdong provincial state security department detained, according to law, secret agents Zhang Yi and Wu Jidong, and seized evidence of their spy activities. [Video opens with shots showing Zhang Yi and Wu Jidong, each held by two policemen, followed by still pictures of evidence including a radio set, letters, a bottle of ink and pens]

    Zhang Yi, male, aged 25, is an unemployed person, while Wu Jidong, male, aged 23, was originally a worker for a certain guesthouse in Canton city. Recruited by the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau, both Zhang Yi and Wu Jidong joined a spy organisation. During the chaotic period in Canton, Zhang and Wu acted according to the directives from the Taiwan spy organisation, received and spread the rumours concocted by the Taiwan Broadcasting Station, and provoked turmoil. They had also repeatedly submitted secret reports to the Taiwan spy organisation on the chaotic situations in Peking and the Canton district.

    With the close co-ordination of the state security organs in Gansu and other localities, the state security organ in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region on 2nd June detained, according to law, special agent Gao Xiaoshi, who was dispatched by the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau. The Ningxia state security organ also seized criminal evidence such as intelligence tools for writing in invisible ink. [Video opens with shots showing Gao Xiaoshi, held by two plainclothes policemen, followed by evidence including a radio, identification cards, a bottle of ink, pens and handbills]

    Gao Xiaoshi, male, aged 32, formerly worked for a certain literary and art organisation in Ningxia. He participated in a spy organisation under the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau outside of China in 1988 and was sent back to China to carry out spying activities. Based on the plan made by the Taiwan spy organisation, he actively compiled information on the chaotic situation in China and secretly reported to the spy organisation in Taiwan on the reactionary handbills which he collected during the turmoil.
    Special agent Qu Zuojie of the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau recently surrendered himself to a Chinese state security organisation. [Video opens with Qu Zuojie sitting on a chair facing his interrogators followed by shots which show Qu entering a building and walking along a street. [Video opens with Qu Zhojie sitting on a chair facing his interrogators followed by shots which show Qu entering a building and walking along a street. Video also shows evidence including coins, paper money and chemicals for spying activities].

    Qu Zuojie, male, aged 26, originally worked for a certain factory in Shenyang City. In March 1989, he joined a spy organisation under the Taiwan Military Intelligence Bureau outside of China. When turmoil prevailed in China, the Taiwan spy organisation immediately sent him back into China to develop organisational ties and promote the ''student movement''. Qu Zuojie's activities in the country had always been closely watched by China's state security organisations. Awed by the power of the masses and the state security organisations, he surrendered himself to the state security organisation in Liaoning on 25th May, explained his assignment and tasks as well as handed over the tools for carrying out his spy activities.

    The cases cracked with regard to these special agents are under investigation. Those spies who surrendered themselves will be treated with leniency after investigation and education.




        ANNEXE 2

    BBC Summary of World Broadcasts August 20, 1990, Monday


    SOURCE: Xinhua News Agency, Peking, domestic service in Chinese 0746 gmt 18 Aug 90

    Text of report

    State security organs have recently solved a number of cases of spies scheming to create turmoil on the mainland, arrested a number of spies and seized a great deal of evidence pertaining to espionage. The Ministry of State Security announced four cases today [18th August] .

    - The Xu Jiansheng case, cracked by the Guangdong provincial department of state security Xu Jiansheng, from Chenghai county in Guangdong Province, joined a KMT spy organisation of Taiwan outside the mainland in 1989. After training, he was sent back to the mainland to engage in espionage. His main task was to establish spy strongholds and organise underground armed forces on the mainland. After arriving on the mainland, Xu established frequent contacts with a KMT spy organisation and actively carried out spying activities. Moreover, he conspired secretly with his spy organisation in an attempt to instigate new turmoil.

    - The Fujian provincial department of state security has solved a spy case involving a military intelligence bureau of the KMT on Taiwan and arrested a number of spies, including Sun Daoshun, Liu Bihua, Chi Hecan and Chen Xuedeng. Sun Daoshun, from Fujian Province's Lianjiang county, joined the KMT military intelligence bureau in 1989. He later recruited Liu Bihua, Chi Hecan and Chen Xuedeng to become spies. They were deployed by their spy organisation to instigate rebellion among our personnel, establish spy organisations, and look for an opportunity to launch the so-called ''democracy movement'' activities in an effort to create turmoil on the mainland. Following the instructions of their spy organisation, Sun Daoshun and the others carried out frantic activities. On many occasions they secretly brought in and distributed videotapes and printed matter compiled by their spy organisation with the aim of instigating turmoil on the mainland.

    - The Hainan provincial department of state security has solved a spy case involving a military intelligence bureau of the KMT on Taiwan and arrested spies Zhan Taixing, Zhou Changzhou and Wang Qianyang. Zhan Taixing, originally from Qionghai county of Hainan Province, joined the KMT military intelligence bureau in 1986. After sneaking into the mainland, he established the so-called ''nuclear armed unit behind the enemy lines''. Zhan Taixing sneaked into Hainan Province many times. He recruited Zhou Changzhou and Wang Qianyang to become spies of the spy organisation, establishedan underground organisation called ''Union of Hainan youth for national salvation'', and conspired to co-ordinate with his spy organisation to ship weapons from Taiwan to the mainland in an attempt to create large-scale unrest.

    - The Henan provincial department of state security has solved a spy case involving a dispatched spy by the name of Bai Xue. Bai Xue, from Kaifeng city of Henan Province, joined a spy organisation of the KMT's military intelligence bureau on Taiwan outside the mainland in 1987. After receiving espionage training, his spy organisation arranged for him to sneak into the mainland to establish ''underground organisations'' and to look for an opportunity to instigate turmoil. Following the instructions of his spy organisation, Bai Xue has secretly supplied his spy organisation with information, such as the situation on the mainland, many times.

    These Taiwan spies have all confessed their crimes, and the cases are being further investigated.


                                                   ANNEXE 3 

    BBC Summary of World BroadcastsAugust 27, 1990, Monday

    SECTION: Part 3 The Far East; B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS; 2. CHINA; FE/0853/B2/ 1; 

    LENGTH: 497 words


    SOURCE: Tibet television, Lhasa, in Standard Chinese 1200 gmt 23 Aug 90

    Text of report

    Led by Jia Chunwang, Minister of State Security, a four-man delegation arrived in Lhasa on 6th August to inspect state security work in our region. After completing its inspection work, the delegation left Lhasa by plane on 22nd August.

    After arriving in Lhasa, Minister Jia, ignoring fatigue from the long journey and reaction to high altitude, began intense inspection work immediately. Over a period of a few days, he listened to a work report by the regional state security department, attended a meeting of the security department to present honorary citations and certificates to the advanced, braved the rain to inspect work sites where state security projects are under construction, called on some cadres who had been hospitalised for treatment of illnesses and cadres who had been transferred to work in Tibet, and conveyed the cordial regards of the leadership of the Ministry of State Security for them.

    Beginning 8th August, Minister Jia Chunwang visited Lhasa city, Xigaze prefecture and Nagu prefecture, travelling more than 3,000 km by car. He inspected grassroots state security organs, border stations and farming and pastoral areas to study the conditions there and to help grassroots state security organs resolve practical difficulties.
    During his spection tour, Minister Jia issued many important instructions on state security work in our region.
    He said In Tibet, the political situation is stable; there are unity and harmony among the nationalities; the people are living and working in peace and happiness; and they want stability, development and prosperity. The situation is gratifying. However, it is necessary to note that the conspiratorial activities of foreign hostile forces and national splittists to infiltrate and sabotage China and effect peaceful evolution in China are still very grave. They have vainly attempted to find a breakthrough in Tibet. We should be mentally prepared for a long struggle against this.

    Minister Jia fully affirmed the work of state security organs in our region.Referring to future work, Minister Jia pointed out State security organs in Tibet shoulder the heavy responsibility of opposing splittism, safeguarding the unification of the motherland and protecting the security of the state. In accordance with the Party Central Committee's principle that stability is above all else and the guilding thought put forward at the fourth party congress of the autonomous region, they should earnestly implement the important directives issued by General Secretary Jiang Zemin during his inspection tour of Tibet, focus on stabilising the situation in Tibet and its economic development, and give priority to the work of stabilising the situation. This is the priority task for state security organs in Tibet.During his inspection tour in our region, the principal leading comrades of the regional party committee and people's government called on him many times to exchange views.
  • John Brennan

     Et un  chef de station de plus! me suis-je dit en apprenant durant septembre 2007 que John Brennan,un officier de la CIA dont je ne me souviens même plus si j'en avais entendu parler ou pas (Pour dire a quel point il n'a vraiment pas retenu mon attention)  avait en réalité été Chef de station de la CIA a Riyad! Wow,ca change tout. Le travail de la CIA en direction de ce pays du Golfe Persique attirait l'attention.Sans doute  parce que ce pays est au coeur du Moyen-Orient,que c'est le pays ou est né  Oussama Ben Laden mais aussi le coeur du wahhabisme,cette division du sunnisme qui prétend faire respecter le Coran a la lettre au point d'inviter a tuer les infidèles! 9cc029f420b3e4c4acadc5bf3e60b32c.jpg

    John Brennan.

    Entré a la CIA en 1980,Brennan a rejoint la Direction du renseignement de la CIA en 1981.Ce service,le Directorate of Intelligence (DI) ,chargée d'analyser les informations recues,est beaucoup moins réputé que son homologue,la Direction des Opérations (DO),chargée des opérations clandestines a l'étranger.Néanmoins,Brennan y fera carrière:Il est envoyé a  Djeddah de 1982 a 1984,officiellement comme membre de la section politique de l'ambassade américaine.De 1984 a 1989,en poste a la Direction du renseignement de la CIA,a la Division Moyen-Orient et Asie du Sud. Il est Chef de la section antiterroriste a la Division du Renseignement de la CIA de 1990 a 1992,chargée de l'analyse des informations.En pleine Guerre du Golfe contre l'Irak de Saddam Hussein.C'est alors une période ou l'on craint les attentats commis par les hommes de main de Saddam Hussein sur les territoires étrangers.Ensuite,Brennan occupe un poste de responsabilité a la Division Moyen-Orient et Asie du Sud a la Direction du Renseignement de la CIA, avant d'être Chargé du briefing quotidien de la Maison Blanche en 1994 et 1995.Pas une sinécure,Bill Clinton ayant la réputation de s'être désintéréssé d'une CIA minée par les scandales.C'est apparement au début des années 90 que Brennan a rencontré George Tenet,Président de la commission permanente sur le renseignement du Sénat US de 1988 a 1993 puis Directeur pour les programmes du renseignement au National Sécurity Council de 1993 a 1995.Les deux hommes vont devenir amis,ce qui va encore accélérer la carrière de Brennan a la CIA.Tenet prend le poste de Directeur-adjoint de la CIA en 1995, et prend Brennan avec lui comme assistant éxécutif. Tenet sera nommé Directeur de la CIA en 1997.Apparement,Tenet a compris la délicatesse des relations américano-saoudienne,puisque en 1996 c'est Brennan qu'il envoie diriger la station de Riyad.

    Sans citer le nom,Robert Baer,alors numéro 2 du Groupe Sud a la Division Asie Centrale de la Direction des Opérations de la CIA n'est pas tendre: Critiquant la nomination par David Cohen (Patron de la Direction des Opérations de la CIA de 1995 a 1997) de personnes "qui n'étaient pas compétentes" a la tête des stations de Tel-Aviv ,Nairobi,mais aussi Riyad,il ajoute sur ce dernier que "la seule qualification du chef de station de Riyad avait été d'avoir travaillé comme conseiller de George Tenet au National Sécurity Council".Il est vrai que Brennan n'a jamais travaillé a la Direction des Opérations de la CIA,son envoi a Riyad est ,en quelque sorte,sa première sortie sur le terrain. Mais la station de Riyad est une station assez particulière,ce n'est pas une station "offensive",c'est-a-dire une station agressive dans le recrutement et le traitement d'informateurs d'origine saoudienne.Pour ne pas fâcher l'Arabie Saoudite,fidèle alliée des américains.Quand,par exemple,a la fin des années 70,circula a Washington un rapport très défavorable sur la situation en Arabie Saoudite,la réponse des autorités saoudiennes fut extrêmement claire:En cette année 1978,le chef de station de la CIA dans le Royaume,George Cave,est déclaré "persona non grata" et expulsé. Les relations se compliquent par le manque de coopération de Riyad vis-a-vis de Washington dans la lutte antiterroriste.C'est pourquoi Brennan est envoyé,pour établir des contacts a haut niveau,faire pression pour que les saoudiens coopèrent.Un exemple est donné par James Risen dans son ouvrage "Etat de guerre":Les saoudiens détenaient en 1997 un des principaux conseillers financiers de Oussama Ben Laden,Sayebd Tahib Al-Madani. Malgré les insistances de la CIA auprès des saoudiens,elle ne put avoir accès a ce personnage que après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001..

    739dcbb3691a767376d9c469229c9562.jpgDégâts causés par la voiture piégée le 13.11.1995

    Pourtant,il y a de quoi déclencher l'alerte: Une voiture piégée explose le 13.11.1995 devant un bâtiment de la Garde Nationale Saoudienne a Riyad.Bilan,7 morts dont 5 américains et 60 blessés. 

    Le 25.06.1996,un camion-citerne Mercedes contenant 2200 Kilos d'explosifs  explose devant les Tours Khobar, le bâtiment ou habitent les militaires étrangers,a 9.50 heure locale (GMT +.3,donc 7h50 heure de Paris).Bilan initial: 20 morts et 372 blessés.


    1cab50f44015412890909ad79dcc9bab.jpgLes Tours Khobar peu après l'attaque terroriste

     On peut donc craindre que les terroristes ne recommencent.Mais Langley refuse,même après l'attaque de Khobar,que l'antenne de Riyad ne collecte des renseignements sur els extrémistes du Royaume.Pour ne pas se fâcher avec les Princes saoudiens que George Tenet s'efforce de séduire.Néanmoins,la station n'est pas complètement inactive.Dans ses mémoires "At the center of the storm",George Tenet rappele que a l'automne 1999 la CIA décide de harceler les officiers du renseignement extérieur iranien ,le MOIS en poste a l'étranger.Question de déstabiliser le principal soutien du Hezbollah.John Brennan,toujours chef de station a Riyad,est donc chargé de contacter son homologue du MOIS a Riyad.Ce qui donne lieu a une scène hilarante:Interpellant l'iranien,il se présente comme étant de l'ambassade américaine.L'iranien bondit de sa voiture,visiblement paniqué,et clamant que l'iran est un pays de paix.Après ce séjour a Riyad,Tenet prend Brennan comme Durecteur de cabinet, jusque 2001 ,avant d'en faire le Directeur éxécutif adjoint du Directeur Central du Renseignement (DCI George Tenet) le 26.03.2001 (Jusqu'en 2004,le patron de la CIA était automatiquement le patron de l'ensemble de la communauté américaine du renseignement,le Directeur Central du Renseignement,DCI).Le 12.03.2003,Brennan est nommé patron du du tout nouveau TTIC (Terrorist Threat Integration Center ),un service interagences chargé de fournir des informations sur les risques terroristes potentiels pour les Etats-Unis.On peut ,néanmoins,que rester sceptique devant la création de ce nouveau service,qui entraîne un nouvel empilement de structures bureaucratiques dans la lutte antiterroriste..

    Inauguration du quartier général du TTIC en 2005. John Brennan et Georges W.Bush


    John O. Brennan President and Chief Executive Officer Mr. Brennan was appointed President and CEO of The Analysis Corporation (TAC) in McLean, VA in November 2005. Prior to joining TAC, Mr. Brennan had a distinguished 25-year career with the Central Intelligence Agency, serving in a variety of senior positions throughout the Intelligence Community. His last assignment was (interim) Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Mr. Brennan was appointed to that position, with the approval of the President, by the Director of Central Intelligence in October 2004. He served as head of the NCTC until August 2005. Mr. Brennan also served as the Director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) from 12 March 2003 until 6 December 2004. When the NCTC was formally launched in December 2004, all functions and responsibilities of the TTIC were transferred to the NCTC.

    Mr. Brennan began his career as an intelligence officer in 1980 with the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations as a Career Trainee. After joining the Directorate of Intelligence in 1981, he served with the Department of State as a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia from 1982 to 1984. From 1984 to 1989, he served in a variety of analytic assignments in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence. Mr. Brennan was in charge of terrorism analysis in the DCI's Counterterrorist Center between 1990 and 1992, including during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. After a management position in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Mr. Brennan served as the CIA's daily intelligence briefer at the White House in 1994 and 1995. Mr. Brennan was the Executive Assistant to then-DDCI George Tenet from 1995 to 1996, and he served as Chief of Station in a major Middle East capital from 1996 to 1999. Mr. Brennan served as DCI Tenet's Chief of Staff from 1999 to 2001 and as Deputy Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from March 2001 to March 2003.

    In April 2007, Mr. Brennan was appointed Chairman of the Board of The Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), a not-for-profit professional association of public and private sector leaders of the intelligence and national security communities.

    Mr. Brennan is the recipient of numerous awards and commendations including the National Security Medal, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, the Director of Central Intelligence Director's Medal, and the Defense Intelligence Agency's Director's Award.

    Mr. Brennan earned a BA in Political Science from Fordham University in 1977, including study at the American University of Cairo in 1975 to 1976. He received a MA in Government with a concentration in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Texas at Austin in 1980.

    Modification de l'article le 26.01.2008 et le 23.04.2008